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1. Introduction  
 
1.1. Research objectives 
 
Systematic underpricing and cyclicity1 are perhaps the most intriguing empirical regularities 
about Initial Public Offerings (IPOs). A vast body of literature has been dedicated to 
explaining these phenomena that, at a first glance, seem to contradict market efficiency 
principles and even the rationality of economic actors.  
The present thesis is intended as an empirical study on how information asymmetries affect 
the timing and the pricing of an IPO.  
Setting out from the last-moment decision of the German infrastructure company Hochtief to 
pull the IPO of its Concessions subsidiary in November 2009, the current thesis explores the 
underlying facts and attempts to provide possible explanations for the IPO failure by drawing 
upon existing theories. Concretely, the thesis builds on the following key questions:  
 Did the cold IPO market and overall investor sentiment lead to the failure of the IPO? 
 Did Hochtief sufficiently underprice its new equity issue to spark investor interest? 
 Were the signals that the company conveyed to the markets convincing enough in 
respect to the value of the firm? 
The paper is structured in 6 main chapters. The introduction outlines the background and 
the research objectives of the paper. The second chapter shortly reviews some key 
empirical findings and theories on IPO pricing and timing to the market. The third chapter 
features a valuation of Hochtief Concessions’ equity meant to provide an estimate of the fair 
value of the company and to make inferences about the extent of underpricing possible. The 
event study analysis in chapter four is designed to capture the market reactions to the IPO 
announcements. Chapter five aims at providing answers to the afore-mentioned questions 
based on the results of the valuation and the event study analysis. Chapter six concludes. 
 
                                                            
 
1 Cyclicity: alternating periods of high and low activity of the Initial Public Offering markets, also referred to as  
waves 
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1.2. Background to the IPO call-off of Hochtief Concessions 
 
The German construction company Hochtief officially announced on the 5th of November 
2009 that it strived for a stock market floatation of its subsidiary Hochtief Concessions AG; 
the transaction would have increased transparency towards investors and eased the access 
to external funds to fuel future growth. 2 
Shortly thereafter, on the 19th of November, the details of the IPO became public: the 
company planned a capital increase of up to EUR 600 mil. and a sale of a fraction of the 
existing equity valued at EUR 282 mil. to 405 mil. that would allow Hochtief to maintain a 
51% majority stake in the new company. The price range for the book-building was set at 
EUR 24 to EUR 29. 3 
The book-building process coordinated by Citigroup, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs and 
Barclays Capital was bound to end two weeks later, before the first floatation day. Although 
initially the price was fluctuating within the upper half of the price range, close to the 
expiration term it converged to the minimum value of 24 EUR, as rumors about a low 
demand spread through the grey markets.4 On the late evening of the 3rd of December, after 
the market close, Hochtief announced the call-off of the Initial Public Offering,5 alleging that 
the financial market turbulences in the wake of the Dubai crisis had led to insufficient 
demand for the its equity.  
Through its significant issue volume, the floatation of Hochtief Concessions would have 
marked the beginning of the long sought recovery of the German IPO markets after the 
financial crisis;6 hence the causes behind its failure attracted public attention, giving way to a 
lot of speculation.  
  
                                                            
 
2 Hochtief Corporate Communications (5.11.2009) 
3 Maug, Ernst (SS 2010) 7 
4 Maug, Ernst (SS 2010) 7 
5 “Equity market unfazed by Hochtief’s late call to pull unit’s Eu1bn IPO” (4.12.2009) 
6 „Studie ‐ IPO‐Boom geht 2009 an Deutschland vorbei“ (9.12.2009) 
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2. Initial Public Offerings. Theory and empirical evidence  
 
Although much of the early IPO literature focused on the US market, its empirical findings 
seem to be extensively supported by recent research on various markets around the world. 
The most documented stylized fact about IPOs is without question the pervasive tendency to 
underpricing: almost invariantly, the first day trading price is systematically reported to 
exceed the one at which the shares were initially sold to investors. The second empirical 
regularity that attracted the attention of academics is the cyclicity of IPO markets: most firms 
go public in times of buoyant stock markets and overall auspicious macroeconomic 
conditions (so-called “hot markets”) and avoid to raise new equity during economic 
downturns (so-called “cold markets”).7  
In a recent study, Brau and Fawcett (2006) confront these empirical findings inferred mostly 
using mathematical models with real managerial decision making in the IPO process.8  
Pursuing this endeavor, they conduct a survey among CFOs centered on key questions on 
IPOs, among which the timing, underpricing and signaling. The paragraph below 
summarizes their findings, showing that the managerial intuition is to a wide extent in-line 
with the theories advanced by the classical IPO literature. 
“CFOs base IPO timing on overall market conditions, are well informed about 
expected undepricing and feel that underpricing compensates investors for taking 
risk.[…] The most important positive signal is past historical earnings, followed by 
underwriter selection.”9 
The current chapter gives an outline of these stylized facts about Initial Public Offerings, 
preparing the discourse on their relevance in explaining Hochtief Concessions’ IPO failure. 
  
                                                            
 
7 Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) 37 
8 CFO: Acronym for Chief Financial Officers 
9 Brau and Fawcett (2006) 1 
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2.1. IPO underpricing under asymmetric information 
 
Systematic IPO underpricing is certainly a puzzling phenomenon, since we would expect 
that, in efficient markets, rationally acting agents would not be willing to sell assets at below 
their worth. However, firms going public are reported to be priced by markets on the first 
trading day above the initial price offered during subscription. The first day premium was 
approximated at 15% in industrialized countries and at around 60% in emerging markets.10  
In Germany, Ljungqvist (1997) finds on a sample of 180 IPOs in the time interval 1970 to 
1993 an average initial return of 9.2%. Similar studies report a first trading day premium of 
15.3% in the US (Ibbotson et al. 1994) and 10.7% in the UK (Jenkinson and Mayer 1988).11 
The money that companies leave on the table in the IPO process represents, on the one 
hand, a profit for the investors who have placed shares in the IPO and on the other a wealth 
transfer from the existing shareholders to the new.12  Even if they don’t sell their shares in 
the course of the IPO, the initial shareholders still incur costs arising from the dilution of their 
stakes.13  
Thus, since underpricing is always to the detriment of the original owners of the company, 
what induces them to go along despite of the wealth losses?  
Whereas in emerging markets underpricing is largely explained by the political intermingling 
and side payments to the parties involved in the transaction, this cannot be the case for 
countries in Western Europe and US. In the attempt to explain underpricing across 
countries, researchers have advanced several theories mostly based on asymmetric 
information and agency models.  
“Depending on the approach, underpricing induces underwriters to exert an optimal 
selling effort, becomes a form of compensation for investors” or translates to a way of 
signaling to the markets the quality of the firm. 14 
                                                            
 
10 Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) 37 
11 Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) 38 
12 Lóránth (2005) 
13 Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) 40 
14 Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) 41 
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We shortly outline here some of the theories thought to have the highest explanatory power: 
Winner’s curse  
This asymmetric information model firstly introduced by Rock (1986) can be regarded as a 
variation of Akerlof’s “lemons”15 problem:  
“Uninformed buyers will withdraw from a market if their informational disadvantage 
results in their adverse selection from the quality distribution of goods.”16  
Analogously, by dividing investors in two broad categories, informed and uniformed, Rock 
contends that while the informed are able to correctly price equity offers, the uninformed 
investors would tend to overbid (“winner’s curse”). Hence, in order to retain the uninformed 
investors and assure sufficient demand on equity markets, the uniformed bidders must be 
aided to break even on average by an ex-ante underpricing of every offering.17 
Ljungqvist asserts that there are some loose ends to this story. For instance, there is an 
alternative solution in assisting uniformed investors to avoid overpaying; informed investors 
(e.g. investment funds) can act as intermediaries for uniformed investors against a fee 
charge.18  
Informational cascade 
This theory predicts that investors do not decide upon investing in an IPO solely based on 
their own value judgments on the equity on offer; their decision also depends on what other 
market participants do; therefore, if the demand for a new equity is low, they too withdraw 
from investing; this effect is referred to as a “bandwagon effect” or “informational cascade”. 
In order to attract first investors that will guarantee sufficient demand, firms underprice their 
stock. 19 
  
                                                            
 
15 Colloquial term for a defective old car. Source: “http://nobelprize.org” 
16 Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) 64 
17 Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) 64 
18 Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) 73 
19 Lóránth (2005) 
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Signaling hypothesis 
Signaling models postulate that, under information asymmetry, IPO underpricing can be 
used as a credible instrument by good firms to demonstrate their asset quality to investors.20 
There are two essential assumptions associated with this model: first, issuing firms have 
superior information about their own future cash distribution than potential investors and 
underwriters do. Secondly, firms organize their equity sale to outside investors in two 
stages: after the initial public offering they return to the markets for a second time to place 
the remaining equity fraction.21 
But what is the concrete role of underpricing given this framework? Grinblatt and Yang 
(1989) offer the following explanation: 
“Many investment professionals typically state that the investor interest generated by a 
low-priced new issue tends to subsequently result in higher-priced shares than would 
not have been possible without the underpricing. […This belief] is also consistent with 
Ibbotson's (1975) conjecture that new issues may be underpriced in order to «leave a 
good taste in investors' mouths.»” 
Thus, the benefit of underpricing is getting a higher price in the second stage of the sale. 
Additionally, assuming a sufficiently high possibility that the quality of the firm is learned after 
the first issue, it must hold that bad firms will not engage in underpricing, since they might 
not be able to enjoy the proceeds of the second stage sale.22  
Ljungqvist’s criticism to the model builds primarily on the fact that, in practice, firms do not 
necessarily “follow two-staged selling strategies”. Furthermore, the way in which the second 
stage is organized does make a difference. Provided that shareholders enjoy pre-emptive 
rights23, signaling will bring no benefit, since the prices offered to the current stockholders 
are typically lower than the market prices. 
 
                                                            
 
20  Grinblatt and Yang (1989) 3 
21 Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) 78 
22 Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) 78 
23 The right of ordinary shareholders to maintain their percentage stake in a company by being able to buy 
enough shares in any new issue to maintain that percentage. Source: "http://glossary.reuters.com "  
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Information revelation models 
In the model of Benveniste-Spindt (1989) on information revelation, underwriters take center 
stage, mitigating between investors and owners in the IPO process. Both the demand and 
supply side have private information: while owners know more about the quality of the 
company going public, outside investors have superior knowledge on the average market 
prices for similar assets. Underwriters help to overcome the conflicts of interest between the 
two through book-building, which becomes a mechanism of incentivizing the outside 
investors to tell the truth: if they misrepresent the true value, they might be rationed out from 
the deal or get just very few shares in the aftermath; if they tell the truth, they get a 
disproportionately high allocation of shares. The compensation for truthfully revealing their 
information is the underpricing of the deal- their gain will thus amount to the overall discount 
that accrues to them. 24 
 
Labeling underpricing simply as a “necessary evil” would be wrong, since there are also a 
series of potential benefits associated with underpricing that need to be carefully assessed. 
Firstly, heavy underpricing leads to excess demand for the respective stock; this is 
perceived by practitioners to indicate the IPO’s success; moreover, it creates great publicity 
for the firm and assures a diversified pool of investors with conveniently low voting rights in 
the IPO aftermath. Secondly, in some countries, “underpricing might serve as a tax-efficient 
way of remunerating employees”, if the tax on capital gains lies well below the employee 
income tax. 25  
The richness of models on IPO underpricing put forward in the dedicated literature is quite 
overwhelming. The set of theories provided in this chapter is not exhaustive; however, it 
represents the main lines of thought. Opinions among academics on which model 
possesses the higher explanatory power seems to widely differ. Ljungqvist argues that the 
winner’s curse and signaling theories, although intuitively appealing, apply only under very 
specific assumptions. He credits the Beneveniste-Spindt model of information production as 
very well supported by the empirical evidence and robust to a variety of frameworks and 
assumptions. In their study, Michaely and Shaw (1994) bring proof for the winner's curse 
                                                            
 
24 Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) 90 
25 Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) 43 
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hypothesis, however they invalidate the signaling theory, showing that “firms that underprice 
more return to the reissue market less frequently”.26  
Coming to Brau and Fawcett’s (2006) study on the actual perceptions of decision makers in 
IPO firms, we find that CFOs having participated in the survey attribute underpricing mostly 
to “market uncertainty and the lack of perfect information”; underpricing “serves to 
compensate investors for taking the risk of the IPO.” CFOs also see underpricing as a way 
“of achieving a wider base of owners” and “a desire of underwriters to favor institutional 
investors." The mean and median underpricing CFOs indicated is 14.9% respectively 10%. 
Brau and Fawcett (2006) test several signaling mechanisms proposed by the IPO literature 
and find that the most important positive signal is a “strong history of earnings”, whereas the 
negative signals are “selling a large portion of the firm in the IPO, as well as selling insider 
shares in an IPO.”27 
 
2.2. IPO timing under asymmetric information 
 
When observing the historical IPO activity across international markets, it becomes obvious 
that IPO timing is not random; the number of companies tapping the equity markets seems 
to rise and fall in a pattern fairly synchronized across different countries. Increasing funding 
needs as a result of entering a new business cycle does not provide sufficient evidence for 
the high variations in IPO volume and activity. A further important determinant is thought to 
be the willingness of the market to supply capital. Firms seem to be able to recognize 
favorable times for going public and use these windows of opportunities in order to fully reap 
the benefits.28 
“Ljungqvist provides evidence that, in Germany, the number of floatations changes 
over time in line with the business cycles, stock market conditions and the gradual 
increase in competitiveness of the underwriter market.” 29 
                                                            
 
26 Michaely and Shaw (1994) 
27 Brau and Fawcett (2006) 414  
28 Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) 46 
29 Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) 48 
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Interestingly, hot issue markets are not characterized just by high issue volumes, but also by 
a higher degree of underpricing. The table below illustrates the cycles in the IPO activity as 
well as the first day returns that were registered in the period 1980-2009 on the US markets. 
 
Figure 1 Number of Offerings and First Day Returns on the US IPO markets in the period 1980-2009 30 
“In Germany, IPOs are more heavily underpriced not only when the market is 
performing well, but also in macroeconomic upswings, when already-listed firms issue 
[..] large amounts of seasoned equity and when stock market volatility is low.” 31  
On the flipside, when overall conditions worsen, the IPO markets do not adjust through 
lower prices, rather more the IPO volume seems to dry up.32  
There are two theories that have been put forward by academics to explain the “hot-cold 
markets” phenomenon. The first one sets out from market efficiency and postulates that the 
good times are characterized by great investment opportunities, guaranteeing handsome 
profits to investors placing their funds in stock issues. On the contrary, cold markets lack 
                                                            
 
30 Ritter (2009) 
31 Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) 51 
32 Lóránth (2005) 
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such investment opportunities and companies issuing equity at these times are believed to 
be of poor quality, since they must be in desperate need of funds. 33 
The second theory assumes that markets are acting irrationally and the shifting from a hot to 
a cold market is determined by a change in investor sentiment: When optimism dominates, 
i.e. in bull markets, investors will indiscriminately buy newly issued stock. In bear markets, 
their willingness to invest in IPOs is considerably lower.34 
As a concluding note, both theories attempting to explain IPO waves implicitly assume the 
presence of asymmetric information. Winding back to the Myers and Majluf model of 1984, 
we can argue that, in order to reduce their cost of capital, companies need to correctly 
identify times of low information asymmetry and use them to raise external funds. Under 
high asymmetric information, however, the decision to go to the equity markets is reduced to 
weighing the incurred dilution costs against the benefits of investing in new projects with the 
freshly raised capital.35 In the context of an IPO, however, underpricing is not just a cost to 
the company’s owners. As we have seen in the previous section, underpricing also has 
upsides, which need to be considered when making the decision of undergoing an IPO. 
 
3. The valuation of Hochtief Concessions 
 
The focus of the current chapter is the valuation of the Concessions subsidiary of Hochtief at 
the time of the IPO announcement. Upon sketching the company’s profile and creating a 
basic understanding for its business model, I introduce the views on the assets quality of the 
company of Hochtief itself and of further external analysts. The overview on the theoretical 
framework in subsection 3.1. is to be closely linked with the explicit description of the 
valuation steps and outcome in subsection 3.2.. I conclude by taking a critical standpoint 
towards the methodology and results of the valuation performed. 
 
                                                            
 
33 Lóránth (2005)  
34 Lóránth (2009) 
35 Lóránth (2009) 
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3.1. Understanding Hochtief Concessions’ business model 
 
Understanding the business model of a company is essential to performing a valuation. The 
industry and the markets in which a firm activates as well as their internal organization and 
business setup are decisive in assessing financial and operating risk and allow for an 
accurate modeling of the future cash flows. 
The current section shortly depicts the company profile of Hochtief Concessions with 
particular focus on the industry, firm age and underlying business logic and succinctly 
defines infrastructure concessions, the business model of interest for the current valuation. 
 
3.1.1. Company profile 
Hochtief Concessions defines itself as “an (…) infrastructure provider with operations in 
several markets worldwide”, acting “both an investor and a manager”. Hochtief offers 
 “one-stop shopping for project development, financing and capital raising, 
construction and project management as well as operation and asset management for 
airports, toll roads, Public-Private-Partnership-based building and renewable energy 
projects.” 36  
In other words, the company covers the entire value chain of services related to complex 
infrastructure projects, ranging from aerial and terrestrial transportation to social facilities. 
Hochtief Concessions emerged as an independent division of Hochtief as recently as 2008 
by combining the Airport and Private-Public-Partnership divisions. In an official statement, 
Hochtief management declared the decision strategic, as it symbolized the group’s 
“recognition of the growing importance of the concessions business.”  
“The new structure would allow for closer cooperation and the reaping of synergies 
in market development, business planning, special operator responsibilities and 
other technical areas”. 37 
The internal reorganization anticipated to a certain extent the upcoming spin-off of Hochtief 
Concessions; one year later, Hochtief Concessions was incorporated as a German stock 
corporation (“Aktiengesellschaft”) and intentions to list the company were made public. The 
                                                            
 
36 Hochtief (2009) 92  
37 Hochtief (2009) 27 
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stock market flotation would further facilitate the access of the company to external funding 
and increase transparency about the value of the firm’s assets.  
As per Hochtief, the portfolio of the Concessions subsidiary comprised to the time of the 
announced IPO 
 “6 holdings in international airports in Europe and Australia 
 7  roads, including 2 tunnels, in Europe and Chile 
 18 projects featuring 95 public sector facilities in Europe in the social infrastructure 
segment and additionally two geothermal energy projects in Germany.”38  
 
3.1.2. The concessions business model of Hochtief  
A thorough analysis of the concessions business model is not in scope of the current thesis. 
The current subsection aims to provide an insight in the source of Hochtief Concessions’ 
earnings and the risks associated with its business model.. 
The concessions model has been experiencing increasing popularity in the past decades in 
the construction and engineering sector. The distinctive element from a conventional 
construction project lies in the transfer of ownership to the service providers over a 
predefined period of time or sometimes even open-end. The desired effect is, without doubt, 
to incentivize the service company to maximize the value of the project by directly linking the 
remuneration of the infrastructure operators to the project cash flows as well as by 
eliminating short-termism. 
Frank Bousquet and Alain Fayard given in their study dedicated to European concessions a 
general definition of the concession business:  
“An infrastructure concession is defined as a contract under the terms of which a 
public authority accords specific rights to a company to construct, maintain and/or 
operate a network for a given period. The following types of contracts [come into 
question]:  
 “BOT (Build, Operate and Transfer): a company funds, constructs, owns and 
operates an infrastructure for a limited period (approximately 30 years), at the end 
of which the infrastructure is transferred at no charge to the concession authority. 
                                                            
 
38 Hochtief (2009) 92 
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 BTO (Build, Transfer and Operate): a company funds and constructs an 
infrastructure, but transfers ownership to the concession authority immediately 
after completion of the construction phase. Then the infrastructure is put at the 
company’s disposal by the government and is operated for a limited period, at the 
end of which all rights are restored to the concession authority. 
  BOO (Build, Own and Operate): a company funds and constructs an 
infrastructure, which it owns and operates for an unlimited period.”39 
Hochtief Concessions applies in its business a mix of these models; as a concessions 
operator, it typically holds minority stakes – less than 50% of equity - in the project company, 
either for a contractually fixed period of time or open-end, deriving “dividends, interest from 
shareholder loans as well as transaction and management fees, plus any gains on market 
placement or disposals of ownership stakes.”40   
The sources of income are thus “projects, stakes, long-term asset management contracts 
and consultancy, as well as earnings contributions from airport investments and timed sales 
of shares held in road projects.”41 
It is useful at this point to note that the risk implied by the concessions business model has 
an additional component to the one stemming from classical construction activities; acting as 
an equity investor in the project companies, it also bears the risk arising from its holdings. 
However, the long term character of concession contracts assures stable, less volatile cash 
flows than a typical construction contract would. 
 
3.1.3. Appraisals of Hochtief’s asset portfolio 
The current subsection introduces the company’s own appraisal of its assets and briefly 
reviews analyst coverage on Hochtief Concessions at the announced floatation date. The 
rationale behind is to familiarize the reader with the grounds based on which  Hochtief priced 
the IPO of its concessions subsidiary and what it considers to be key value drivers. The 
review of the methodology applied by Hochtief to compute the value of its assets was 
considered necessary, as it might explain potential differences between the pricing made by 
Hochtief and the result of the valuation performed in the context of this thesis.  
                                                            
 
39 Bousquet and Fayard (2001) 2 
40 Hochtief (2009) 26 
41 Hochtief (2010) 
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 Hochtief’s self-appraisal of asset quality  
 
In its first press release on the IPO plans, Hochtief sought to make a case about the 
attractiveness of the assets of its concessions subsidiary. The arguments presented 
included some financial information considered conclusive, such as past and expected 
earnings, project portfolio structure and net present value of assets. Hochtief provided the 
following snapshot of Hochtief Concessions’ historical performance: 
 
Key figures (EUR mil)  
Q1-Q3  
2009 
Q1-Q3  
2008 
2008 2007 2006 
Adjusted operating cash flow 80.1 150.1 173.3 51.9 46.7 
Profit before taxes/ EBT 51.3 91.4 106.2 168.6 29.5 
Combined net profit 28.4 56.4 63.9 102.4 9.9 
Table 1 Snapshot of Hochtief Concessions’ historical performance 42 
 
In the same press release, Hochtief’s management also clearly stated its beliefs respective 
of the assets quality and future growth fueled by a sound investment policy:  
“«Hochtief Concessions has very attractive assets. We have generated positive 
results for years. The fact that even in the first nine months of the crisis year 2009 we 
were able to achieve significantly positive after-tax income shows the quality of our 
assets. In the face of volatile markets our ability to do so very much suits investor 
demand» explains Peter Noé, a member of the Hochtief Executive Board and the 
future CEO of Hochtief Concessions AG. […] 
The outlook for the industry’s further development is good: various market studies 
expect continued growth in air and road traffic over the coming years. «We want to 
exploit these opportunities actively and are ready for the IPO», Noé underlines. Over 
the course of the next five years, HOCHTIEF Concessions plans to invest up to EUR 
                                                            
 
42 Hochtief Corporate Communications (5.11.2009) 
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500 mil. into existing projects — of which EUR 321 mil. are earmarked for Budapest 
airport. It also plans to invest up to EUR 100 mil. in projects for which the company 
already has preferred bidder status.” 43 
 
In respect of the earnings, Hochtief also defends the latest decreasing trend in reported 
earnings, asserting that the years prior to 2009 were affected by “extraordinary items” which 
inflated the overall figures. Corrected for these effects, the resulting year-on-year earnings 
should be at comparable levels. 
Furthermore, Hochtief evaluates its portfolio of infrastructure projects at EUR 1.54 bil. per 
year-end 2009, of which airports EUR 1,282 mil., roads EUR 208 mil. and social 
infrastructure EUR 53 mil.44 Out of the total value of the concessions portfolio of EUR 1.54 
bil., Hochtief declares EUR 888.9 mil. to represent the investment per year end 2009.45 It is 
important to document what methods and assumptions stand behind these figures in order 
to interpret them correctly: 46 
 The valuation method used is the discounted cash flow method, applied to the 
company and its subsidiaries 
 The relevant cash flows used in the valuation are those “between project companies 
and Hochtief, […]comprising capital paid in and withdrawn such as dividends, 
interest and fees” 
 Considered for the valuation are only projects that Hochtief estimates to win with a 
very high degree of probability; Hochtief designates these as “having reached 
financial close” 
 The risk-adjusted discount rate is derived by adding on top of the basic risk-free 
interest rate some predefined risk mark-ups contingent on project type and 
completion stage.  “As projects move toward completion, risk and hence the mark-up 
drops and the value of “Hochtief’s assets rises. “ As of December 31, 2009, the 
applied discount rate for its airport holdings was an average rate of 13%, which it 
considers to be aligned with market prices and which is reportedly kept stable over 
time; for roads and social infrastructure projects, Hochtief applies a risk-adjusted 
                                                            
 
43 Hochtief Corporate Communications (5.11.2009) 
44 Hochtief (2010) 
45 Hochtief (2009) 28 
46 Hochtief (2009) 28 
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discount rate “determined with reference to secondary market transactions.” Hochtief 
derives a weighted discount rate of 12.1% for the entire project portfolio of airports, 
roads and social infrastructure. It is important to keep in mind that these discount 
rates are the project related discount rates. For the entire concessions company, 
Hochtief indicates a different weighted average cost of capital (see Table  2  Value 
Added Generation reported by Hochtief ). 
 
Project phases Development Construction Ramp-up Growth Maturity 
Risk markup for 
the project phase 
(%) 
 
3 2   
Risk markup for  
the project type 
(%) 
 
2-4 2-4 2-4 2-4 
Risk free base 
rate (%) 
 
6 6 6 6 
Discount rate 
(%) 
 11-13 10-12 8-10 8-10 
Figure 2 Matrix used by Hochtief to calculate project discount rates 47 
Hochtief additionally assesses the added value generation for each of its business segments 
by contrasting the calculated return on net assets48 against the weighted average cost of 
capital. According to the 2009 annual report, HC generated a return on net assets of 12.1% 
(in 2008: 14%), whereas it’s weighted average cost of capital was indicated at 10.1%. The 
Airport subsidiary produced a RONA49 of 13.3% (2008: 14.2 percent), above the cost of 
capital. 50  
However, the computation method used deviates from the classical approach.  E.g. 
Damodaran gives a basic definition of the return on capital as the “return earned on the 
existing assets or projects of a firm, calculated as  
                                                            
 
47 Hochtief (2009) 28 
48 The return on net assets is equal to the return on invested capital 
49 Acronym for Return on Net Assets (equal to the Return on Invested Capital) 
50 Hochtief (2009) 60 
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ሺ1 െ ݐሻܧܤܫܶ
ܤܸ ݋݂ ܦܾ݁ݐ ൅  ܤܸ ݋݂ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ െ ܥܽݏ݄ 
where the operating income after tax is usually from the most recent time period and the 
numbers in the denominator are either from the start of that period or an average value.“51 
Hochtief derives the return on net assets using 
 The operating earnings before tax and amortization (EBITA) plus interest income 
from the group’s financial assets 
 The net assets figure, which is computed by ”adding interest- bearing liabilities items 
on the published balance sheet: shareholders’ equity, pension provisions, and 
financial liabilities. As RONA is calculated on a pretax basis, deferred taxes are 
eliminated from the net assets figure to remove tax effects.”52 
The cost of capital is calculated on “a weighted average basis” by plugging the required 
parameters into the cost of capital equation. 
Divisions Return 
2009  
(EUR mil) 
Net 
assets 
2009  
(EUR mil.) 
RONA 
2009 (%) 
WACC53 
2009 (%) 
Value 
created 
2009 
(EUR mil.) 
Value 
created 
2008** 
(EUR mil.) 
HOCHTIEF 
Concessions  
of which: 
155.1 1,283.0  12.1  10.1  25.7  48.8 
HOCHTIEF 
Airport 
145.0  1,093.5  13.3  10.2  33.9  41.0 
HOCHTIEF PPP 
Solutions 
16.6  191.5  8.7  9.6  -1.7 7.7 
Table 2 Value Added Generation reported by Hochtief 54 
 
A useful observation in relation to Hochtief’s approach to computing its return on capital is 
that the incorporation of pre-tax operating income before amortization in the returns leads to 
                                                            
 
51 Damodaran Online (2010) 
52 Hochtief (2009) 60 
53 Acronym for Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
54 Hochtief (2009)  62 
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reporting a higher figure and thereby a better performance than the common method would 
produce. Thus the question whether the earnings considered by Hochtief for the calculation 
actually accrue to the investors and if they allow for an accurate estimation of the earned 
returns. 
 
3.1.4. An analyst’s view on the value of Hochief’s assets 
Shortly after the call-off of the IPO, the analysts of Bankhaus Lampe made a brief clinical 
analysis of the case, putting forward some possible causes for the IPO failure and giving 
judgments regarding the IPO pricing.  
They argued that the price perceptions of institutional investors were rather more at the 
lower end of the book-building range of EUR 24 to 29. According to the analysts, however, 
Hochtief was not at all willing to sell below its own price expectations and also saw itself 
under no pressure to get the deal through. This expectations mismatch led to the low 
demand for the new equity. 
They further present some facts to underpin their hypothesis: In the stock exchange 
prospectus Hochtief declared the “net” present value of assets at 30.9.2009 of EUR 1.54 bil, 
net debt amounting to EUR 781.9 mil. and the equity minority stakes EUR 385.6 mil. 
Hochtief specified the equity value at EUR 543.8 mil. Bankhaus Lampe cross-checked these 
values with a multiple based valuation; they measure for the group of peers a post-notation 
market-to-book value of 1.7 for the reference year 2010, so that a price of about EUR 26 for 
Hochtief Concessions’ shares would have been a fair one according to their calculations. 55 
  
                                                            
 
55 Bankhaus Lampe Research (2009) 
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3.2. Theoretical framework  
 
With the aim of deriving an estimate for Hochtief Concessions’ equity value, I performed a 
three-staged discounted cash flow (DCF) valuation with pretax free cash flows to firm as well 
as a relative valuation based on an EBIT56 multiple. The comparative company valuation 
was intended as a cross-checking of the results yielded by the DCF valuation. 
The current subsection lays the theoretical foundation required to perform the valuation by 
briefly outlining the variants of the DCF and multiples methods relevant for the current 
thesis, as well as some general considerations concerning the selection and preparation of 
the valuation input data.  
 
3.2.1. The Discounted Cash Flow Valuation  
The DCF method is perhaps the approach to valuation most commonly used by 
practitioners. Damodaran gives a brief, but very suggestive definition of the idea that lies at 
the core of the discounted cash flow method:  
“The value of any asset should be a function of three variables: how much it generates 
in cash flows, when these cash flows are expected to occur and the uncertainty 
associated with these cash flows.”57 
Thus, the free cash flows are the compensation to investors for the opportunity cost they 
incur by putting their funds in the firm; the expected cash flows need to be discounted 
according to the inherent systematic risk borne by investors, reflecting the uncertainty about 
the cash flows materializing.58 
With the aim of arriving at the market value of the firm’s equity, one can choose between two 
DCF variants, which, if performed correctly, should yield the same results: the firm valuation 
and the equity valuation. The firm valuation uses cash flows to both creditors and 
shareholders and discounts these by a weighted average cost of capital. The equity 
valuation implies the discounting of cash flows to equity-holders with the appropriate 
                                                            
 
56 Acronym for Earnings Before Interest and Tax 
57 Damodaran (1999) 439 
58 Copeland, Koller and Murrin (2000) 201 
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discount rate, i.e. the opportunity cost of equity. The firm valuation is at the margin preferred 
by practitioners to the equity valuation since it does not require an explicit forecasting of the 
firm’s debt payments59. This firm valuation was also used in the context of the thesis for 
deriving Hochtief Concessions’ equity.  
According to Koller (2005), a DCF valuation of a firm comprises three main steps:  
1. the valuation of the company’s operations, entailing the “discounting of the cash 
flows at the weighted average cost of capital” 60 
2. the valuation of the company’s non-operational assets, such as excess cash, 
“marketable securities, nonconsolidated subsidiaries and other equity investments” 61 
3. identifying and valuing all “non-equity financial claims” on the assets in place, 
including “fixed and floating rate debt, pension shortfalls, employee options and 
preferred stock” 62 
The value of the operating and non-operating assets add up to the total firm value; 
Damodaran designates the value of operating assets as “enterprise value”; the equity value 
can be derived by subtracting further the non-equity financial claims from the enterprise 
value, as depicted in the figure below. 
 
Figure 3 Deriving the market value of equity 63  
                                                            
 
59 Gemeinböck (1999)  44 
60 Koller (2005) 104 
61 Koller (2005) 104 
62 Koller (2005) 104 
63 Damodaran (2006) 241 
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3.2.1.1. Estimating the Free Cash Flows  
Computing the cash flows that are generated by operating the assets in place and projecting 
these into the future is the starting point of each evaluation. Essential at this stage is to 
strictly differentiate between the cash flows produced by operating the left-hand side of the 
balance sheet and those that arise from the company’s financing activity. In a world with 
perfect markets and no taxes, the capital structure has no impact on firm value. However, 
when setting out from real markets, one should separate the cash in- and outflows induced 
by the financing decisions, such as equity or debt issues, dividends or interest payments.64 
Being the output of the firm under an all-equity-finance fiction, the operating cash flows can 
also be referred to as “unlevered”.65 The firm leverage will nonetheless be accounted for by 
selecting an appropriate discount rate for the cash flows. 
When using accounting data to derive the unlevered cash flows, one needs to take into 
consideration that income and cash flow statements are inconsistent with the cash flow 
separation rule described above, furthermore the terms used in accounting for the three 
components can be misleading. E.g. the accounting based operating profit entails interest 
payments and corporate taxes while ignoring the investments in the company’s assets.  
The following table summarizes some basic differences between the accounting treatment 
of such items and the interpretation they are given in the context of a valuation: 
Valuation Input Accounting Treatment Valuation Definition 
Capital 
Expenditures 
Internal investments in 
tangible assets 
Investment in long term assets, includes 
 R&D expenses for tech firms 
 Acquisitions of other firms (cash as well as stock) 
 Increases in operating lease commitments 
Depreciation and 
Amortization 
Follows accounting rules  
Tax-deductible depreciation in tax 
books (not reporting books) 
Working Capital 
Current assets –  
Current liabilities 
Non-cash current assets –  
Non-debt current liabilities 
Table 3 Potentially misleading accounting terminology in the context of a valuation66  
                                                            
 
64 Grinblatt and Titman (2002) 303 
65 Grinblatt and Titman (2002) 303 
66 Damodaran (n.a.) 7 
22 
 
Grinblatt suggests that the following adjustments be carried out in order to obtain the free 
cash flows from the EBIT (earnings before interest and tax): 
 
Figure 4 Deriving the Free Cash Flows from the EBIT67 
This calculation scheme will thus be applied to derive for each year in the reference period 
the arising free cash flows. 
  
3.2.1.2. The treatment of equity holdings 
In his paper “Dealing with Cash, Cross Holdings and Other Non-Operating Assets: 
Approaches and Implications”, Damodaran discusses the accounting treatment and effects 
on firm value of equity holdings. Depending on the portion of firm value held, he defines 
three categories of holdings, each entailing a different accounting approach.  
 If the holdings exceed 50% of overall ownership of the firm, the investment 
represents a majority active investment and is to be fully consolidated in the balance 
sheet of the investing firm.  
 Otherwise, the investment falls under one of the categories 
−  passive minority investment (holding represents less than 20% of overall firm 
ownership) or  
                                                            
 
67 Grinblatt and Titman (2002) 305 
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− active minority investment (holding represents between 20% and 50% of the 
overall firm ownership).68 
As Hochtief only has minority investments in its portfolio, we will focus on the latter two 
categories, i.e. minority stakes. 
Minority passive investments have an “acquisition value, [that is] what the firm initially paid 
for.” Depending on the purpose of the holding, Damodaran describes the possible reporting 
of the respective holding 
 “For investments held to maturity, the valuation is at historical cost or book value. 
Interest or dividends from this investment are shown in the income statement. 
 For investments available for sale, the valuation is the market value, but the 
unrealized gains or losses are shown as part of the equity in the income sheet and 
not in the income statement.  
 For trading investments, the valuation is at market value and the unrealized gains 
are shown in the income statement.”69  
For the valuation of Hochtief’s project portfolio only investments held to maturity are actually 
relevant, as this represents an inherent characteristic of the concession model: the 
concessionaire “owns” stakes in the project company for a predefined period of time 
covering the construction phase, but typically extended well beyond the project delivery. The 
purpose of Hochtief’s holdings are neither trading them nor making them available for sale. 
Damodaran suggests as a first hand solution for the valuation of companies with holdings to 
separately consider each holding and the stand-alone firm according to a sum-of-the-parts 
logic. A significant advantage in doing so arises when the “parent and the subsidiaries have 
very different characteristics [in terms of] cost of capital, growth rates and reinvestment 
rates”.70 This is not the case for Hochtief Concessions, where the infrastructure projects are 
integrated in the business model.  
Furthermore, Damodaran recommends the approach of a direct valuation of the 
consolidated firm in case of insufficient information or numerous holdings. Both criteria apply 
                                                            
 
68 Damodaran (2005) 38 
69 Damodaran (2005) 38 
70 Damodaran (2005) 41 
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to Hochtief Concessions’ portfolio containing over 30 projects, each organized as an 
independent private company. 
In the context of a relative valuation, Damodaran recommends to use multiples based on 
earnings in order to estimate the value of a firm with cross-holdings. However, he maintains 
that firm value multiples based on revenues, operating income, EBITDA71 etc. do not 
function “if all adjustments for minority investments occur below the operating income line”.72 
Hochtief Concessions includes the net income from minority investments in the operating 
income, which speaks for the adequacy of using multiples calculated for industry peers. 
The excerpt below from the annual report of Hochtief describes the underlying calculation of 
the operating earnings (EBITA): 
 
Figure 5 Hochtief’s calculation scheme for the operating earnings73  
The rationale of including the net income of minority investments in the EBIT of the firm is 
explained by Hochtief: “the net income from participating interests contains all income and 
expense from equity stakes held for operational purposes and is thus an integral part of 
operating earnings”.74 
  
                                                            
 
71 Acronym for Earnings before Interest, Tax, Depreciation and Amortization 
72 Damodaran (2005) 47 
73 Hochtief (2009) 188 
74 Hochtief (2009) 188 
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3.2.1.3. Choosing the tax rate 
Damodaran makes a few suggestions concerning the choice of the tax rate to be applied 
when calculating and projecting the free cash flows to the firm. While advising against the 
use of the actually paid taxes, he points out that the choice needs to be made between 
effective tax rates and marginal tax rates. One possibility is to use the effective tax rate for 
the early forecast years and move towards a marginal tax rate in the later years. Grinblatt 
and Titman also propose the use of the marginal tax rate when interest is fully tax 
deductible.75 
According to P+P Pöllath + Partners, the headline tax rate on corporate income in Germany 
has three components 
 An aggregate tax burden of 15%, introduced through a reform in 2008 and in 
force as of 2008 
 The solidarity surcharge of 5.5% levied on the amount of corporate income tax 
 A basic trade tax rate of 3.5% as of 2008, supplemented by the application of a 
multiplier fixed by the respective municipality that varies from a minimum rate of 
200% (prescribed by the federal law) up to around 500%. Consequently, the 
effective trade tax rate ranges from 7% to around 17.5%. 
The overall corporate income tax in Germany lies thus in the interval of 22.825% to 
33.325%.76  
 
3.2.1.4.  Forecasting the FCF 
Making sensible future-looking assumptions is critical to valuing businesses; even slight 
variations of the growth rates in earnings and cash flows can have considerable impact on 
the outcome of a valuation. Thus the prerequisite to projecting growth is to identify its 
drivers, thoroughly analyze how their movements affect value and anticipate future 
development. We build on this topic with particular focus on earnings growth and its relation 
to the expected free cash flows.  
                                                            
 
75 Grinblatt and Titman (2002) 464 
76 Global Legal Group (2009) 4 
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One starting point that comes to mind when modeling future growth is historical growth, 
provided that one can observe a certain “persistence” therein. In the search for empirical 
evidence of growth “persistence”, Damodaran reviews the results of relevant literature: most 
studies show that firms experiencing high growth over a five-year period are not more likely 
to carry on at the same pace over the next period than other firms77; furthermore, firms with 
high growth tend to be the exception, the “median of the earnings growth corresponding 
closely to the growth in the domestic product.”78  
In the same line of argument, Damodaran uses empirical data of net income growth among 
publicly traded US firms to examine signs of sustained growth for two consecutive five-year 
periods. The results represented in the table below show no significant correlation between 
two different periods. 
 
  2002- 2007 
19
97
- 2
00
2 
Growth Class  Lowest 2 3  4  5 Highest 
Lowest  13.73%  7.19%  7.52%  9.80%  13.07%  48.69% 
2  27.27%  6.74%  12.61%  15.84%  17.01%  20.53% 
3  15.23%  14.09%  27.27%  20.45%  11.14%  11.82% 
4  10.03%  14.09%  34.15%  21.14%  11.38%  9.21% 
5  9.09%  12.63%  24.24%  28.79%  12.12%  13.13% 
Highest  16.32% 10.88% 19.67% 22.18% 13.81% 17.15% 
Table 4 Net Income Growth Persistence79  
Furthermore, Damodaran also maps correlations between two-five year growth rates for a 
variety of metrics for several firm size groups: 
                                                            
 
77 Little (1962) in: Damodaran (2008) 17  
78 Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok (2003) in: Damodaran 17 
79 Damodaran (2008) 18 
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Growth Classes Revenues  EBITDA  EBIT  Net income  EPS80 
Smallest  0.078  -0.071  -0.018  0.000  -0.068 
2  -0.063  0.117  -0.265  -0.314  -0.338 
3  0.034  -0.257  -0.233  -0.200  -0.325 
4  -0.022 -0.182 -0.302 -0.271 -0.355 
Table 5 Correlations in growth for two consecutive five year periods81 
The conclusion that arises by examining the table above is that accelerated growth will most 
probably not be sustained long-term as growth rates between two consecutive periods 
display very low correlations. Thus historical growth is rarely indicative of future firm growth; 
there must be other driving forces behind future growth.  
Damodaran contends that earnings growth can be traced back to two factors: investment in 
new assets, which he coins as “sustainable growth” and improving efficiency on existing 
assets, termed as “efficiency growth”. In the context of a DCF enterprise valuation, these 
translate to the reinvestment rate and the growth rate of the after-tax operating income. 82 
We set out from the basic equation for the value of the firm as the present value of the cash 
flows of the firm discounted at the cost of capital: 83 
 
ܸ݈ܽݑ݁ ݋݂ ݂݅ݎ݉ ൌ ෍ ாሺி஼ிி ೟ሻሺଵା௞೎ሻ೟
∞
௧ୀଵ
 , with 
 
݇௖ - the average cost of capital  
FCFF - the free cash flows to the firm. 
Rewriting the free cash flows in the reference period as  
 
ܨܥܨܨ ൌ ܣ݂ݐ݁ݎ െ ݐܽݔ ܱ݌݁ݎܽݐ݅݊݃ ݅݊ܿ݋݉݁஼௨௥௥௘௡௧ െ ሺܥܽ݌. ܧݔ. െܦ݁݌ݎ݁ܿ݅ܽݐ݅݋݊ሻ െ ∆ܹ݋ݎ݇݅݊݃ ܿܽ݌݅ݐ݈ܽ 
 
and the current reinvestment rate as 
 
                                                            
 
80 Acronym for Earnings‐per‐Share 
81 Damodaran (2008) 18 
82 Damodaran (2008) 6 
83 Damodaran (2008) 7 
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ܴ݁݅݊ݒ݁ݏݐ݉݁݊ݐ ݎܽݐ݁ ൌ ሺܥܽ݌. ܧݔ. െܦ݁݌ݎ݁ܿ݅ܽݐ݅݋݊ሻ െ  ∆ܹ݋ݎ݇݅݊݃ ܿܽ݌݅ݐ݈ܽܣ݂ݐ݁ݎ െ ݐܽݔ ݋݌݁ݎܽݐ݅݊݃ ݅݊ܿ݋݉݁  
 
the first equation becomes: 
ܸ݈ܽݑ݁ ݋݂ ݂݅ݎ݉ ൌ ෎ ܣ݂ݐ݁ݎ െ ݐܽݔ ܱ݌݁ݎ݅݊݃ ݅݊ܿ݋݉݁஼௨௥௥௘௡௧ሺ1 െ ܴ݁݅݊ݒ݁ݏݐ݉݁݊ݐ ݎܽݐ݁ሻሺ1 ൅ ݃௔௧ ைூሻ
௧
ሺ1 ൅ ݇௖ሻ௧
ஶ
௧ୀଵ
 
where gୟ୲ OI represents the growth rate of the after - tax operating income.  
Damodaran gives the following interpretation to the derived identity: 
“A higher expected growth in after-tax operating income will also increase the value of 
a business, if you hold the reinvestment rate and cost of capital fixed. However, 
increasing growth by increasing reinvestment and/or raising the cost of capital may 
decrease the value of the firm.”84 
By defining as ܧ௧ the earnings, ܫ௧ as the investment at the start of period t and ܴܱܫ௧ as the 
return on that investment, the following identities hold 
ܧ௧ ൌ ܫ௧ ܴܱܫ௧, 
∆ܧ ൌ ܫ௧ ܴܱܫ௧ െ ܫ௧ିଵ ܴܱܫ௧ିଵ. 
Thus, the growth rate is 
݃ ൌ ∆ாா೟షభ ൌ
ூ೟ ோைூ೟ିூ೟షభ ோைூ೟షభ
ா೟షభ . 
Considering the scenario of constant ROI (ܴܱܫ௧ ൌ  ܴܱܫ௧ିଵ), the expression can be reduced 
to 
݃ ൌ ܴܱܫ ∆ܫܧ௧ିଵ 
In other words, the growth in earnings will depend on the return on the investment earned by 
the firm and the “proportion of the earnings” that are channeled into new investments.85 
                                                            
 
84 Damodaran (2008) 7 
85 Damodaran (2008) 28 
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Departing from the simplifying assumption of constant return on investment, provided that 
the return on new investments does not differ from the return on existing investments in the 
same period, one can derive the identity 
ࢍ ൌ ࡾࡻࡵ ∆ࡵࡱ࢚ି૚ ൅
ࡾࡻࡵ࢚ െ ࡾࡻࡵ࢚ି૚
ࡾࡻࡵ࢚ି૚  
In this case, the growth rate has an additional component given by the year-on-year 
increase of the return on investment. 
The equations above hold true for both growth in operating income and in equity earnings. 
Hence, one can replace the generically defined “change in investment” ∆ூா೟షభ and “return on 
investment” ROI with the corresponding metric. For operating income, the change in 
investment will translate to the reinvestment rate and return on investment to return on 
invested capital. 86 
These equations will be used in Hocthief Concessions’ DCF valuation to derive the growth 
rate based on the forecasted reinvestment rates and returns on capital. 
 
Growth perpetuities 
Up until now the focus fell on assumptions and empirical facts documenting growth rates 
over the explicit forecast intervals. Further we look at possible approaches to quantify the 
growth and further key determinants beyond the clear-cut forecast periods.  
When considering in the earnings forecasting a terminal stage characterized by a constant 
growth rate in perpetuity, the following equation can be applied to derive the present value of 
the free cash flows: 
ܲ ௧ܸ ൌ  ܨܥܨ௧ାଵܹܣܥܥ െ ݃௦௧௔௕௟௘  
Where ܨܥܨ௧ାଵ are the expected free cash flows for the upcoming year and WACC the 
weighted average cost of capital.87 
                                                            
 
86 Damodaran (2008) 29 
87 Damodaran (2006)  182 
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The resulting present value of the cash flows is also referred to as the continuing value.88 
The period is set in the continuation of the explicit forecast periods, for which the growth 
pattern is specified on a detailed level, year-on-year. 
There are two important considerations when computing the continuing value: 89 
 First, the growth rate used in the model has to be less than or equal to the growth 
rate in the economy 
  Second, the reinvestment rate and profitability levels used to estimate the free cash 
flows to the firm should be consistent with the stable growth rate chosen. The best 
way of enforcing this consistency is to derive the reinvestment rate from the stable 
growth rate and the return on capital that the firm can maintain in perpetuity, as it has 
been previously shown.  
 
3.2.1.5.  Estimating the cost of capital 
While the cash flows to the firm used in the DCF valuation remain unaffected by the 
financing mix of debt and equity, the cost of capital depends on the capital structure choices 
the firm makes. When varying the debt-equity proportions and thereby the cost of capital, 
the company can create additional value. When the cost of capital drops, firm value rises 
and vice versa. 
There are three basic inputs required to compute the cost of capital: the opportunity cost of 
equity, the after-tax opportunity cost of debt and the proportions of market value based debt 
and equity. As with increasing leverage the riskiness of the equity increases and the 
probability of default as well, both costs of equity and debt can be regarded as functions of 
the debt-equity ratio 90 – thus they need to be valued in tandem.  
Copeland and Koller define a set of rules for a correct estimation of the weighted average 
cost of capital: 91 
 All sources of funds need to be considered, regardless of their nature – common 
stock, preferred stock, straight debt, subsidized debt, leases etc.  
                                                            
 
88 Copeland, Koller and Murrin (2000) 267 
89 Damodaran (2006) 247 
90 Damodaran (2006) 277 
91 Copeland, Koller and Murrin (2000)  203 
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 For consistency with the cash flow computation, it is necessary to use the after-tax 
cost of capital; by doing so, the tax shield effects are taken into account 
 Looking at opportunity costs is a must, since each investor expects to be 
compensated for foregone investment opportunities 
 Also market values and not book values have to be used, since market values are 
the better approximate of the underlying claim for each type of financing 
Considering only two sources of capital, non-callable, non-convertible debt and equity, the 
weighted average cost of capital is given by the equation 
ܹܣܥܥ ൌ ݇ௗሺ1 െ ௖ܶሻ ஽௏ ൅ ݇௘
ா
௏,  with 
݇ௗ the expected pre-tax market-based yield to maturity on non-callable, non-convertible 
debt, 
 ௖ܶ  the marginal tax rate of the valued firm,  
݇௘  the market-determined opportunity cost of equity capital,  
ܦ  the market value of the non-callable, non-convertible debt and   
ܧ  the market value of the firm’s equity. 92 
Theoretically, the correct approach is to use a different WACC for each year, reflecting the 
fluctuations of the factors determining it. It is however common practice to use one WACC 
for the entire forecast, 93 which is also applied in the DCF valuation of Hochtief Concessions. 
 
3.2.1.6. Setting the capital structure 
The required inputs for deriving the capital structure represent the market based values of 
the firm’s financing mix. Copeland, Koller and Murrin (2000) suggest the use of target capital 
structures instead of current ones for the following reasons: 
 At any point in time, the capital structure may not be the desired capital structure, but 
a temporary result of financing decisions  
                                                            
 
92 Copeland, Koller and Murrin (2000)  203 
93 Copeland, Koller and Murrin (2000)  203 
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 The fluctuations of market values of securities can also affect the leverage level, thus 
the observable capital structures might deviate from the intended capital mix 
 Using a target capital structure eliminates the circularity dilemma in determining the 
weighted average cost of capital. The circularity is given by the fact that both the 
debt-equity ratio and the market value of equity are required inputs in the estimation 
of the other one’s value.94 
Two factors need to be taken into account when determining the target capital structure:  
 the leverage of similar companies and 
 the current market based leverage as a result of management’s policy towards 
financing the business.95 
Looking at the leverage of similar companies when deriving the capital structure of a firm 
serves two purposes: 
 First, one can conclude whether the firm’s leverage nears the industry averages or if it 
is an outlier, the product of a rather unusual financial policy.    
 Second, it might be the case that there is not sufficient information available to enable 
a direct estimation of the company’s financing mix, e.g. for privately held firms, thinly 
traded firms, subsidiaries of a publicly held company. The way out is to use 
comparables to assess the target capital structure.96 
In determining the current weights of the different types of financing, one should employ, 
where possible, the current prices at which they trade on the market. In case the respective 
claims are not traded, the best estimates need to be developed. E.g. for debt, the market 
value can be neared by considering all debt contracts, assessing for each the credit quality 
based on ratings, deriving the yield to maturity for which it would trade by referencing 
securities with equivalent coupons, maturities and ratings and finally computing the “present 
value of the stream of financing payments, using the yield to maturity as the discount rate.”97  
  
                                                            
 
94 Copeland, Koller and Murrin (2000)  249 
95 Copeland, Koller and Murrin (2000)  205  
96 Copeland, Koller and Murrin (2000)  209 
97 Copeland, Koller and Murrin (2000) 
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3.2.1.7. Computing the cost of equity 
There are several possibilities of deriving the cost of equity of the firm, among which the 
CAPM98 , “a model of the relation of risk to expected return”: 
݇௘ ൌ ݎ௙ ൅ ߚ௟௘௩௘௥௘ௗ · ݎ݅ݏ݇ ݌ݎ݁݉݅ݑ݉ 
where ݎ௙ is the risk-free rate, ݇௘ the cost of equity and ߚ௟௘௩௘௥௘ௗ the levered equity beta. 99  We 
detail in the next subsections how to estimate each parameter required for this equation. 
 
3.2.1.8. Deriving the equity betas 
When assuming a constant level of debt over time and a sustained profitability and 
creditworthiness, the levered beta or equity beta can be further derived by unlevering the 
asset beta as follows  
ߚ௟௘௩௘௥௘ௗ ൌ ߚ௨௡௟௘௩௘௥௘ௗ · ሾ1 ൅ ሺ1 െ ݐሻ ܦܧሿ 
Thus the levered beta is equal to the unlevered beta plus a markup directly proportional to 
the debt-equity ratio and inversely proportional to the corporate tax rate. 100 
The unlevered beta reflects the business risk and the operating leverage applied, thus can 
be derived by looking at industry peers of the company in question.101 In choosing the beta 
of subsidiaries, as in our case, one needs to be cautious and extend the search for 
comparables beyond the parent company to potential lookalikes within the industry. Using a 
firm’s beta (cost of capital) to evaluate certain subsidiaries is usually not a good choice 
mainly for 3 reasons: different business risk, different firm age and different growth 
opportunities as perceived by the markets. If all firm subsidiaries are identical, borrowing the 
beta of the parent could work well, in most cases, however, using it could bias the entire 
valuation, especially if the company is diversified across several industries. Furthermore, 
differences could arise from the fact that newly created divisions might have a higher 
operational risk than other mature divisions of the firm - this could be reflected in higher 
investment levels, different mix of fixed and variable costs or “more options associated with 
                                                            
 
98 Acronym for the Capital Asset Pricing Model, developed by W. Sharpe (1964) and John Lintner (1965) 
99 Grinblatt and Titman (2002) 131 
100 Grinblatt and Titman (2002) 465 
101 Damodaran (2006) 284 
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it than the firm as a whole.” 102 It might also be that a subsidiary carries less business risk 
than the parent company or it might be more highly leveraged. This would automatically 
require that a lower cost of capital be applied to the subsidiary than to the entire group.  
An essential argument to be made in conjunction with this topic is that a firm’s market value 
is determined not only by its existing assets, but also its future growth prospects as 
assumed by the markets, even if concrete growth opportunities are not yet “on the drawing 
board.” Grinblatt and Titman (2002) explain that these growth opportunities, other said a 
“firm’s perceived ability to develop new profitable projects” are linked with high betas.  When 
choosing comparison firms in the context of a valuation, the growth options should be an 
important decision factor alongside with the nature of the business.   
“There is no good rule of thumb for adjusting the risk of comparison firms for growth 
options. Usually, but not always, growing franchises like Starbucks, promising biotech 
and internet firms […]—which have high price-earnings ratios—or firms with high 
ratios of market value of equity to book value of equity have valuable growth options. 
However, the systematic risk of these growth options, which is the risk that is relevant 
for discounting, depends on how strongly the growth is tied to the health of the 
economy. The stronger the tie to the health of the economy, the riskier the growth 
option.”103 
It is a known fact that the construction industry is cyclical. This transpires also from the 
relatively high equity betas of the firms active in this sector. The concessions business, 
however, shows a considerably lower sensitivity to market movements, at relatively similar 
leverages. In the light of the arguments above, it might be more adequate to use the 
concessions sector as a reference sector for the business risk of Hochtief’s subsidiary.   
  
                                                            
 
102 Grinblatt and Titman (2002) 391 
103 Grinblatt and Titman (2002) 392 
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3.2.1.9. Choosing the riskfree rate 
The building block in estimating the returns of risky assets is the riskfree rate.104 Copeland 
and Koller define it as  
“the return on a security or portfolio of securities that has no default risk whatsoever 
and is completely uncorrelated with returns on anything else in the economy.”105 
Damodaran formulates two prerequisites for an asset to qualify as riskfree: 
 “No default risk, which generally implies that the security has to be issued by a 
government.  
 There can be no uncertainty about reinvestment rates, which implies that there are 
no intermediate cash flows.”106 
For short-term Treasury bill rates, Damodaran shows that even if they have virtually zero 
default risk, the second condition does not hold, since the return of a treasury bill is 
unknown. For a long term horizon, the same reinvestment uncertainty issue arises if the 
bond pays a coupon.  
A second aspect is the necessity to match the duration of the riskfree rate to that of the cash 
flows. As cash flow forecasting periods are long term, Damodaran recommends the use of 
the 10-year default free government bond as a proxy for the riskfree rate. 107 
 
3.2.1.10. Finding the market risk premium 
It is general consensus and also intuition that riskier assets should earn a premium over the 
riskfree rate in order to compensate the holders for the risk they expose themselves to.108 
The risk premium attached to an investment in the market portfolio is determined by several 
factors: 
 Investor risk aversion: with rising risk aversion, the premium required for 
channeling funds away from the riskfree asset into the risky one should increase too. 
                                                            
 
104 Damodaran (2006) 35 
105 Copeland, Koller and Murrin (2000) 266 f 
106 Damodaran (2006) 45 
107 Damodaran (2006) 45 f 
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To a certain extent, this risk aversion is inborn. However a certain portion is induced 
by the macroeconomic environment. It has been observed that investors have a 
higher risk appetite when the economies are thriving and on the contrary, they 
require higher risk premiums in recessions, after large market drops. 109 
 Perceptions of macroeconomic risk: the health and stability of the economy in 
terms of inflation and volatility of economic growth also influences how much risk is 
attributed to investing in the equity markets. 
 Information uncertainty:  there is evidence that investors might demand larger risk 
premiums in markets dominated by imprecise and also insufficient information 
 Liquidity: market illiquidity generates additional risk to investors, who become 
forced to pay large transaction costs “to liquidate equity positions”. Researchers 
have shown that the illiquidity effect accounts for a high portion of the equity risk 
premium and varies not only across markets but also through time, being connected 
to economic cycles.110 
There are three basic approaches to estimating equity risk premiums: 111 
 “the survey approach, where investors or managers are asked to provide estimates 
of the equity risk premium for the future 
 the implied approach, where future cash flows or observed bond default spreads are 
used to estimate the current equity risk premium.”112 In other words current equity 
prices or risk premiums are estimated by looking at the behavior of non-equity 
markets 
 “the historical return approach, where the premium is based upon how well equities 
have done in the past.” This represents also the most common approach to 
estimating equity risk premiums.  
As the results yielded by each approach vary considerably, the question arises on which one 
of the models provides the best estimate. Damodaran argues that “the choice will depend 
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upon the forecast period, whether your believe markets are efficient and whether you are 
required to be market neutral in your analysis.”113 
Accordingly, he attributes the highest explanatory power to the implied approach. If one 
believes in the efficiency of markets, the choice needs to be made between the historical 
return and the implied premium approach. Conversely, non-believers should resort to the 
numbers delivered by the survey approach. 
 
3.2.1.11. Estimating the cost of debt 
The cost of debt for a firm is a function of the firm’s bankruptcy costs and probability of 
defaulting. The higher the leverage of a firm, the higher the default risk and the return that 
the debt-holders require as compensation for their investment.114  
One approach to measuring the default risk is by using the credit rating. For investment-
grade debt, the risk of bankruptcy is low and the yield to maturity might be a good estimate 
of the opportunity cost. However, for less than investment-grade debt, the promised yield to 
maturity is no longer a good proxy for the firm’s cost of debt. It is necessary to use instead 
the expected yield to maturity. 115 
Grinblatt and Titman reiterate this idea: 
“Using the promised yield times one minus the corporate tax rate as the cost of debt 
might work for relatively risk-free debt. However, this after-tax yield is generally not the 
cost of debt capital for highly levered firms. For firms with risky debt, the promised 
return on debt is larger than the debt’s expected return due to the possibility of default. 
Therefore expected rather than promised returns should be input for the WACC.” 116 
Damodaran proposes three steps in estimating the cost of debt based on credit ratings.  
 First, estimate “a firm’s dollar debt” and interest expenses at a given leverage 
                                                            
 
113 Damodaran (Feb 2010) 85 
114 Damodaran (2006) 255 
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 “Second, derive the financial ratio that measures default risk and use the ratio to 
estimate a rating for the firm; again, as firms borrow more, this rating will decline.” 117 
 Third, add to the risk free rate a default spread corresponding to the determined 
rating and obtain as a result the pre-tax cost of debt. Apply the marginal tax rate to 
the pre-tax cost to arrive at the after-tax cost of debt.118 
 
3.2.1.12. Getting from Firm Value to Equity Value 
It was mentioned in the first subsection of the current chapter that the value of the firm can 
be broken down into equity and non-equity claims. Before proceeding to disentangling the 
two in order to arrive at the value of equity, it is necessary to incorporate the value of the 
non-operating assets in the total firm value. 
  
Figure 6 Steps to deriving the value of equity119 
By non-operating assets we understand all assets of a firm that are not considered as a 
constituent of operating income, e.g. cash and marketable securities, operating income from 
minority holdings or own unutilized assets. As they are excluded from the earnings and free 
cash flow computations, these assets need to be added on top of the value of the operating 
assets.  
The next step is then to consider the non-equity claims against the company, ranging from 
interest bearing debt to unfunded pension plans, health care obligations to lawsuits that 
might result in large payouts. These should all be netted out against firm value to arrive at 
                                                            
 
117 Damodaran (2006) 273 
118 Damodaran (2006) 273 
119 Damodaran (2006) 241 
39 
 
equity value. In summary, the computations required to get from operating asset value to 
equity value are presented in the table above.120 
 
3.2.2. The Relative Valuation 
The relative valuation method has become increasingly popular in practice, largely due to its 
fairly simple structure, making it is less time-consuming and easier to communicate to 
external stakeholders than a fundamental valuation. The idea behind relative valuation or 
“ratio comparison”, as Grinblatt and Titman coin the approach, is to infer the value of an 
asset based on how other similar ones are priced by the markets.121 The implicit assumption 
is that the markets attach “similar prices to similar assets”.122 
The first step in a relative company valuation is to identify the comparable traded firms – the 
selection needs to be made carefully; it does not suffice that the comparables are within the 
same industry as the firm subject to the valuation; one needs to consider all factors that 
affect firm value: underlying cash flows, risk and growth opportunities.123 
Secondly one needs to decide upon a variable that is considered to be indicative of the 
asset quality - practitioners frequently use cash flows, earnings (EBITDA, EBIT), book 
values, replacement values or other sector-specific variables.124  
The third step entails scaling the values of the comparables to the variable chosen and 
deriving a mean value – the result is a market value multiple which Damodaran refers to as 
a “standardized price”.125 
Finally, the value of the firm in scope is determined by applying the multiple to the 
company’s figure for the given variable. 
Damodaran makes four recommendations in respect to performing a relative valuation: 
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123 Damodaran (2006) 309 
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 controlling for differences that may persist across the comparable firms; there are 
several techniques serving this purpose which Damodaran illustrates, ranging from 
subjective adjustments to modifying multiples or statistical techniques.126 
 “ensuring that the multiple is defined consistently and that it is measured uniformly 
across the firms being compared 
 examining the cross sectional distribution of the multiple, not only across firms in the 
sector being analyzed but also across the entire market..”127 
 
3.3. Outline of the valuation approach and results 
 
3.3.1. The Discounted Cash Flow Valuation  
Following the guidelines described in the previous sections, I performed a discounted cash 
flow valuation with the aim of deriving the fair value of Hochtief Concession’s equity. 
 
 The free cash flow calculation and projection 
Using the financial and accounting data mainly contained in Hochtief’s annual reports 
respectively published by the German Federal Ministry of Justice, I computed in a first step 
the free cash flows for the reference year 2009. 
I start by adjusting the reported earnings before interest, tax and amortization for 2009 in 
order to obtain the clean EBIT figure. The EBIT derived also includes the net income from 
participating interests, as this is to be regarded in the case of Hochtief as a main component 
of the operating income (see chapter 3.2.1.2 The treatment of equity holdings). 
By applying in the reference year the effective tax rate and moving on to a marginal tax rate 
starting with the first forecast year,128 I arrived at the after-tax operating income (NOPLAT), 
which I further adjusted by adding back depreciation and amortization as well as the yearly 
change in working capital.  
                                                            
 
126 Damodaran (2006)  309 
127 Damodaran (2006)  302 
128 Details on the German corporate income tax were provided in section 3.2.1.3 Choosing the tax rate. 
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As a last step I subtracted the gross capital expenditure in order to obtain the Free Cash 
Flows to the Firm (see Figure 4 Deriving the Free Cash Flows from the EBIT).  
As their accounting treatment substantially differs from the interpretation they are given in 
the context of a valuation, R&D expenses and operating leases require further corrections of 
the earning structure. For operating leases, it is necessary to add back the interest paid on 
the lease and subtract the yearly depreciation, whereas R&D expenses are to be added 
back, capitalized and deducted from the earnings in the form of a  the yearly amortization. 
These actions are however not applicable in this context, since Hochtief reports no operating 
leases for its concessions subsidiary and the R&D expenses are not quantified on the 
income statement. 
The resulting free cash flow for the reference year 2009 is summarized in the table below: 
 
Free Cash Flow Calculation  2009 
    
EBIT (Mil EUR)   113.9
   Marginal tax rate (%) 33.325%
NOPLAT=EBIT(1-tax rate) 75.943
 +Depreciation and amortization (Mil EUR) 1.038
 - Change in Working Capital (Mil EUR) 5.304
 - Gross Investment (Mil EUR) 49.00
 - Adjustments (R&D, operating leases) 0
Free Cash Flows   22.676
Table 6 Free Cash Flow Calculation for the reference year 
 
I also computed the current reinvestment rates and the return on capital employed129 using 
the after-tax operating income as described in the previous sections. 
 
                                                            
 
129 The return on invested capital is equal to the return on net assets 
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Key figures 2009
Growth rate   15.17%
Reinvestment rate   25.20%
Return on capital employed 6.04%
Growth rate NOPLAT   -20.01%
   
Sales (Mil EUR)   378.9
WC (Mil EUR)   40.277
Table 7 Historical key figures for the reference year 
 
 The cash flow forecast 
Based on the considerations on growth drivers presented in chapter 3.2.1.4, I constructed 
the cash flow forecast (see Table  6  Free  Cash  Flow  Calculation  for  the  reference  year) using 
three growth stages, respectively two 5-year periods and a growth perpetuity, as follows: 
i. A five year period of accelerated growth, characterized by both profitability 
enhancements and reinvestment increases, bringing the firm in the final year to 
reach the industry average return on capital employed; as the largest portion of the 
earnings is represented by the net income from minority equity holdings in the 
airport project companies, I considered the return on capital employed of airport 
companies as a reference value, which I compared against the returns of 
comparable companies in the construction and engineering sector. 
ii. A five year period of stable profitability at industry average; the reinvestment 
rate and the return on capital are maintained at constant levels throughout this 5 
year stage. 
iii. A cash flow perpetuity starting in the eleventh year of the forecasting timeframe, 
defined by a conservative growth rate, in line with the average growth rates in the 
relevant industries and with the expected GDP130 nominal growth for Germany. The 
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relevant macroeconomic indicators - the real GDP growth rate and the inflation 
forecasted for Germany - were obtained from the EIU countrydata database. 131 
I maintained a stable marginal tax rate, with the implicit assumption that the level of 
profitability will also be sustained throughout the period.   
Depreciation and amortization was increased year on year as well in order to be consistent 
with the reinvestment policy. The depreciation and amortization is assumed to be fully tax 
deductible. 
Considering the working capital as a stable ratio of the generated revenues,132 I estimated 
the yearly change in working capital. I defined the growth pattern of the revenues by taking 
into account three aspects: the historical revenue growth, the average expected revenue 
growth in the airport and construction & engineering sectors and the development of EBIT. 
The gross capital expenditure was computed using the relation described in chapter 3.2.1.4  
between gross investment, depreciation and amortization and the change in working capital. 
As Damodaran shows, this hinders a disconnection between the assumed reinvestment rate 
and the forecasted level of investment. 133 
 
 The weighted average cost of capital 
I further moved on to determining Hochtief’s weighted average cost of capital (see Table 9 
Computation of the present value of the free cash flows). 
As Hochtief Concessions is not a public company, the information on the market value 
based debt and equity as well as their expected returns is absent.   
Hence the target capital structure was set by looking at comparable firms in the construction 
and engineering industry that adopted the concessions model as well;134 the selected 
market-debt-to-enterprise-value ratio of 52.12% represents the observed capital structure of 
Hochtief’s competitor Vinci, which through its portfolio structure (airports minority holdings) is 
                                                            
 
131 Data obtained from the “EIU countrydata” Database for macroeconomic indicators and forecasts 
132 The average Working‐Capital‐to‐Sales Ratios per industry obtained from Prof. Damodaran’s Website 
(Damodaran Online) 
133 The calculation steps obtained from Prof. Damodaran’s Website (Damodaran Online) 
134 Detailed 2009 company information for European firms obtained from Prof. Damodaran’s Website 
(Damodaran Online) 
44 
 
perceived to draw nearest to Hochtief Concessions. Further comparable firms (Bilfinger 
Berger, ACS, Bouygues) also are characterized by similar debt/equity ratios, while 
Damodaran estimates the industry average at 52.158% for construction and engineering 
firms. The current leverage ratio of Hochtief is indicated at 46.17%. The airport providers 
seem to have a lower leverage, ranging from 8% to 54.6% (Fraport AG), whereas the 
leverage of the road concessions companies fall in the interval 27.2% to 64.5%. 
In estimating the equity beta, I started from the assumption that the business risk of Hochtief 
Concessions is best reflected by the airport sector - since the airport holdings make up the 
largest portion of Hochtief Concessions’ income, the incoming cash flows are strictly 
interlinked with the performance of the airport companies in which it invested. Hochtief 
makes use of this approach too, as it resorts to expected developments in the airport traffic 
to forecast its future growth.  
As the construction sector is highly cyclical, for the companies active in this sector we 
observe high betas, which might not apply to their concessions subsidiaries as well. These 
most probably have less volatile earnings due to the long-term nature of the concessions 
commitments and the reliance mainly on the health of other sectors.  
I thus selected a listed airport company similar to the ones in Hochtief’s portfolio (Fraport 
AG135) and unlevered its beta to arrive at the asset beta of Hochtief Concessions. Using the 
target capital structure set as described above, I performed the relevering operation in order 
to arrive at the equity beta. 
 
Figure 7 Estimation of the levered beta of Hochtief Concessions 
                                                            
 
135 Fraport AG “operates and manages the Frankfurt hub and is active on four continents through investments 
and subsidiaries. Operates airports as concessionaire.” Source: “http://www.fraport.com” 
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Using the implied equity premium as per Q4 2009 136 and the yield of the long term 
government bond in Germany as the riskfree rate,137 I plugged in the numbers in the CAPM 
equation to obtain the cost of equity. 
Given the stable level of profitability and creditworthiness, the debt was assumed to be 
riskfree. Thus the expected yield was conservatively chosen as the upper bound of the 
borrowing costs indicated by Hochtief of 8.10%138. Damodaran estimates the expected yield 
per industry by adding a default spread to the riskfree rate. He estimates a cost of debt of 
8% for the air transport companies and 7% for the heavy construction sector. 
As all components are expected to remain fairly stable, the weighted average cost of capital 
computed by using the formula introduced in chapter 3.2.1.5 was also kept constant year on 
year. 
 Computation of the equity value 
The present value of the enterprise139 results by adding to the continuing value the cash 
flows discounted over the 10 year period at the weighted average cost of capital. 
By subtracting the net financial debt140 I arrived at the market value of equity of EUR 702.97 
mil. (see Table 10 Deriving the share price for Hochtief Concessions) 
The number of shares by which to divide the value of equity was inferred from the 
information made public by the company during the IPO preparation and crosschecked 
against the data published by the German Federal Ministry of Justice on its online 
publication platform for companies (Elektronischer Bundesanzeiger). Accounting also for the 
fact that Hochtief announced to convert debt claims in value of EUR 722 Mil in equity 
effective with the IPO, the share price obtained is of EUR 28.50, which falls close to the 
upper bound of the price interval set by Hochtief for the IPO (EUR 24 to 29). 
 
                                                            
 
136 Implied equity premium provided on Prof. Damodaran’s Website (Damodaran Online) 
137 Long‐term government bonds obtained from Bloomberg. “http://www.bloomberg.com” 
138 Hochtief (2009)  156 
139“Enterprise value” refers to the value of operating assets. “Firm value” includes additionally the non‐
operating assets, in our case, excess cash 
140 Market value of debt netted of excess cash and marketable securities 
 Table 8 Free Cash Flow Projection for Hochtief Concessions 
 
Free Cash 
Flow 
Projection 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 TV 
Reference 
Year 
High 
Growth 
High 
Growth 
High 
Growth 
High 
Growth 
High 
Growth 
Moderate 
Stable 
Growth 
Moderate 
Stable 
Growth 
Moderate 
Stable 
Growth 
Moderate 
Stable 
Growth 
Moderate 
Stable 
Growth 
Growth in 
perpetuity 
Sales growth rate 15.17% 15.00% 15.00% 15.00% 15.00% 15.00% 12.00% 12.00% 12.00% 12.00% 12.00% 6.00% 
Reinvestment rate 25.20% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 
ROC 6.04% 6.83% 7.62% 8.42% 9.21% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 5.00% 
Growth rate 
NOPLAT -20.01% 17.22% 16.18% 15.44% 14.94% 14.61% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 3.00% 
Sales (Mil. EUR) 378.900 435.735 501.095 576.260 662.698 762.103 853.556 955.982 1070.700 1199.184 1343.086 1423.671 
Working Capital 
(Mil. EUR) 40.277 46.319 53.266 61.256 70.445 81.012 90.733 101.621 113.815 127.473 142.770 151.336 
EBIT (Mil. EUR) 113.900 136.170 158.197 182.630 209.918 240.579 255.014 270.315 286.534 303.726 321.949 331.608 
Marginal tax rate 32.000% 33.325% 33.325% 33.325% 33.325% 33.325% 33.325% 33.325% 33.325% 33.325% 33.325% 33.325% 
NOPLAT (Mil. 
EUR)  77.452 90.792 105.478 121.769 139.963 160.406 170.031 180.232 191.046 202.509 214.660 221.100 
Depr.  & amortiz. 
(Mil. EUR) 1.038 1.194 1.387 1.601 1.840 2.109 2.236 2.370 2.512 2.663 2.822 2.907 
Change i Working 
Capital (Mil. EUR)  5.304 6.042 6.948 7.990 9.188 10.567 9.721 10.888 12.195 13.658 15.297 8.566 
Gross Investment 
(Mil. EUR) 49.000 61.710 71.621 82.652 95.006 108.919 113.975 121.397 129.334 137.826 146.915 144.133 
FCF 24.186 36.317 42.191 48.707 55.985 64.163 68.012 72.093 76.419 81.004 85.864 88.440 
  
Present value of cash 
flows 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
FCF (EUR mil) 36.317 42.191 48.707 55.985 64.163 68.012 72.093 76.419 81.004 85.864 88.440 
  
Target capital structure 
 (MV(D)/MV(D+E)) 52.12% 52.12% 52.12% 52.12% 52.12% 52.12% 52.12% 52.12% 52.12% 52.12% 52.12% 
Equity Beta 1.066 1.066 1.066 1.066 1.066 1.066 1.066 1.066 1.066 1.066 1.066 
Riskfree rate 3.41% 3.41% 3.41% 3.41% 3.41% 3.41% 3.41% 3.41% 3.41% 3.41% 3.41% 
Market risk premium 5.30% 5.30% 5.30% 5.30% 5.30% 5.30% 5.30% 5.30% 5.30% 5.30% 5.30% 
Cost of equity 9.0623% 9.0623% 9.0623% 9.0623% 9.0623% 9.0623% 9.0623% 9.0623% 9.0623% 9.0623% 9.0623% 
Cost of debt 8.10% 8.10% 8.10% 8.10% 8.10% 8.10% 8.10% 8.10% 8.10% 8.10% 8.10% 
WACC 7.15% 7.15% 7.15% 7.15% 7.15% 7.15% 7.15% 7.15% 7.15% 7.15% 7.15% 
  
Disc. cash flows (EUR mil) 33.892 36.746 39.589 42.466 45.420 44.930 44.447 43.968 43.495 43.026   
Terminal Value (EUR mil)                     1066.888 
Table 9 Computation of the present value of the free cash flows 
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Present value of Enterprise (EUR mil) 1484.866 
-Net Market Value of Debt (EUR mil) 781.9 
= Current equity value (EUR mil) 702.966 
+Loans to be converted in equity at IPO (EUR 
mil) 722 
/Number of shares (mil.) 50 
=Share price (EUR) 28.50 
Table 10 Deriving the share price for Hochtief Concessions 
 
3.3.2. The Relative Valuation 
Grinblatt and Titman note that  
“since earnings are often smoothed proxies for long-run cash flows [… practitioners] 
consider a multiple of [...]annual earnings observed at comparison firms when valuing 
the initial public offering of a company’s common stock.”141 
Consistent with Grinblatt and Titman’s suggestion, I opt for an EBIT based relative valuation. 
EBIT was preferred to the net income as it is not affected by taxation and financing policies. 
In screening the relevant industries (construction and engineering, airport operators and 
transportation concession sector) for similar companies, I considered the three main criteria 
as defined by Damodaran (see section 3.2.2):  
 cash flows: equity minority holdings and project development need to be an 
important source of cash flows 
 risk: the firm needs to operate under a concessions contractual form; the portfolio 
needs to contain airport and infrastructure holdings; the financial leverage needs to 
be similar to the one of Hochtief Concessions 
 growth opportunities: expected growth rates in earnings need to be comparable 
                                                            
 
141 Grinblatt and Titman (2002) 443 
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Out of the entire pool of firms available in the 3 industries, I selected 4 firms that best fit the 
above described criteria. 
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Strabag SE 
(WBAG:STR) Engineering $3,373.30 $5,775.10 41.59% 1.82 12.21 15.00% 6.28% 
Vinci SA 
(ENXTPA:DG) Engineering $28,280.00 $59,076.10 52.13% 1.19 11.65 2.37% 12.78% 
Actividades de 
Construcción y 
Servicios, S.A. 
(CATS:ACS) 
Engineering $15,657.70 $35,967.70 56.47% 0.68 18.19 4.30% 8.70% 
Fomento de 
Construcciones 
y Contratas, 
S.A. 
(CATS:FCC) 
Engineering $5,119.60 $18,515.50 72.35% 0.88 13.14 10.00% 6.73% 
 Median      54.30% 1.04 12.67 7.15% 7.71% 
Standard 
deviation  2.99  
Table 11 Comparables selected for the relative valuation142 
The median of the Enterprise-Value-to-EBIT ratio for the comparable firms lies at 12.67. 
Interestingly, the mean across all industries143 (see table below) is of 12.53, whereas the 
mean of the engineering firms lies at 12.21. 
By applying the multiple of the comparables class to the EBIT of Hochtief Concessions, I 
derived an enterprise value of EUR mil. 1444.38. After subtracting the net financial debt, we 
arrive at a share price of EUR 27.69. 
 
                                                            
 
142  Detailed  2009  company  information  for  European  firms  obtained  from  Prof.  Damodaran’s  Website  
(Damodaran Online) 
143  Detailed  2009  company  information  for  European  firms  obtained  from  Prof.  Damodaran’s  Website 
(Damodaran Online) 
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Relative Valuation     
        
Enterprise  value  to 
EBIT multiples 2009
Std  Mean 
All Industries (3166 firms)  452.34  12.53 
Engineering (113 firms)  50.22  12.21 
 Class of comparables  2.99  12.67 
        
EBIT in 2009 (EUR mil.)  113.9    
     
Enterprise value (EUR mil.)    1444.38
 ‐ Debt outstanding (EUR mil.)  781.90    
=Value of Equity (EUR mil.)  662.48    
 / Nr of shares (mil)  50.00    
Value per share (EUR)  27.69    
        
        
 
Table 12 EBIT based relative valuation of Hochtief Concessions144 
 
3.3.3. A critical standpoint to the valuation performed 
One of the main difficulties in performing a valuation of Hochtief Concessions resided in the 
scarcity of information available to the public about the company and its financial 
performance. Being a subsidiary of Hochtief AG, the financial results of Hochtief 
Concessions are not reported separately, but are reflected only in a consolidated form on 
group level. Nevertheless, in its annual reports, Hochtief gives an overview of each 
segment’s performance and sector-related financial indicators which provided the basis for 
further analysis. Additional sources of information constituted the financial statements made 
available by the Federal Ministry of Justice (elektronischer bundesanzeiger) on Hochtief’s 
main subsidiary (Hochtief Airport GmbH), as well as public releases and analyst coverage 
                                                            
 
144 Calculation scheme adapted from Prof. Damodaran’s Website (Damodaran Online) 
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surrounding the initial public offering plans, which disclosed the estimated value of the 
assets in place and the terms of the desired IPO. 
As Hochtief Concessions is not a traded company, further key characteristics that serve as 
input to a market based valuation - such as the equity beta, the capital structure or the 
market value of debt – were unavailable. One workaround was to observe other similar 
companies in terms of business model, growth opportunities and financing mix and make 
sensible assumptions on how these relate to the firm in scope of the valuation. 
Furthermore, the business model of Hochtief Concessions displays a high level of 
complexity due to the numerous project companies in which it holds minority stakes. Ideally, 
each of the equity holdings in Hochtief’s portfolio and the stand-alone firm should have been 
separately valued and added up, according to a sum-of-the-parts logic. Given the insufficient 
information on the project companies and the very large number of stakes (31 as per 
November 2009), this approach was not considered feasible in the context of the current 
thesis. Instead, the company was valued as a whole, which must be a rational assumption 
since the asset portfolio is not diversified: consists mainly of airport and road infrastructure 
holdings. 
Additionally, it is necessary to note that the applied model, just like any other discounted 
cash flow models, is very sensitive to variations in the parameters used as inputs - such as 
the macroeconomic conditions, the return on capital or the opportunity cost of capital. 
For comparison purposes, I present how changing some of these numbers affects the share 
price: 
 By increasing the return on capital with one percentage point to 11%, we derive a 
share price of EUR 32.46, which translates to an increase of 13.9% from the initial 
price of EUR 28.5 
 Using an equity beta of 1.2 instead of 1.066 we arrive at a price of EUR 26.13, which 
lies 8.3% below the initial estimation 
 If applying a riskfree rate of 4% instead of 3.41%, the prices decreases by EUR 2 to 
EUR 26.5 
As a final point, the accuracy of the relative valuation is contingent on how well the selected 
comparables proxy for the firm to be valued. Clearly there can be no identical companies on 
the market, but understanding the differences and controlling for them might help to 
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considerably reduce the bias they feed into the valuation. Also the “fact that multiples reflect 
the market mood”145 of the moment might translate to an implicit mispricing of all assets.   
The overall message of the current subsection is that the results of the performed valuation 
are to be consumed with caution. Inferences and interpretations are possible only with strict 
reference to the valuation framework applied -  in other words by keeping in mind that the 
input data and methodology used as well as the assumptions formulated are decisive for a 
valuation. 
  
                                                            
 
145 Damodaran (2006)  287 
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4. Event study analysis 
 
The focus of the current chapter is the event study conceived to measure the variations in 
Hochtief’s stock returns triggered by the IPO announcements of its concessions subsidiary. 
Following a very brief theoretical introduction on event studies and their employment in the 
area of corporate finance, I describe the methodology used in the event study and the 
results obtained. By building on the output of a test statistics, I subsequently give an 
interpretation of the outcome of the analysis and shortly discuss possible biases. 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Event studies have been extensively used in corporate finance to establish how various 
corporate decisions or events affect the market value of the firms’ equity. Setting out from 
the assumption that markets are rational and current asset prices reflect all public available 
information, event study analysis attempts to quantify the “firm specific” idiosyncratic stock 
price reaction induced by announcements containing information relevant to the future 
development of the firm. 146 
An event study involves in a first step the estimation of the expected return around the event 
of interest – also referred to as a normal return - followed by the computation of the 
abnormal return, defined as the difference between the observed returns and the expected 
returns. The abnormal returns are typically aggregated over a time period considered 
sufficient and necessary to capture the full effect of the announcement - varying from 1 day 
(the announcement date) to 3, 5 or 41 days centered on the announcement date. As a final 
step, it is necessary to show that the abnormal returns are statistically significant. If one 
considers that stock returns are “jointly multivariate normal and independently and 
identically distributed through time”; rejecting the null hypothesis that the given event has no 
impact on the behavior of security returns translates to showing “that there is either a mean 
effect or a variance effect ”147  
                                                            
 
146 Campbell (1997) 152 
147 Campbell (1997) 149 
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Initially introduced by Dolley in 1933 to study the effect of stock splits on equity value, the 
basic framework for the event study analysis was developed to the form that is essentially in 
use today by Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969).148 Currently 
event studies dominate the empirical research in the area of corporate finance, one 
particular field of interest being the price effects of financing decisions - as the case of the 
event study described in this paper is. In this regard, researchers have found that firms 
tapping the equity markets for funds typically experience a drop in the stock price; the  two—
day average abnormal returns of equity issue announcements have been quantified to 
different orders of magnitude, e.g. Asquith and Mullins (1986) find a mean of -2.7%, 
whereas Mikkelson and Partch (1986) report abnormal returns of -3.56%. Such stylized facts 
have motivated the development of new theories attempting to explain market reactions and 
the signaling effect of financing decisions in the presence of asymmetric information, such 
as  Ross (1977), Myers and Majluf (1984) and Miller and Rock (1985).149 These predict that 
firms willing to raise equity will try to time the market for low levels of information asymmetry, 
when stock prices are nearing the fair value.150 
Another strand of research postulated, by observing the abnormal returns around the 
announcement dates, that spin-offs generate excess value for investors. Cusatis, Miles, and 
Woolridge (1993) come across large positive excess returns following spin-offs over the 
period 1965-1988 for both parent companies and subsidiaries, proving that a strategy of 
investing in firms undergoing or emerging from spin-offs provides superior investment 
performance.151 Miles and Rosenfeld (1983) investigate the effect of a voluntary spin-off152  
announcement on shareholder wealth. Their findings confirm that “spin-off announcements 
have a positive influence on stock prices and that the relative increase in share price is 
greater for large spin-offs than for small ones”.153 
 
                                                            
 
148 Campbell (1997) 150 
149 Dierkens (1991) 181 
150 Dierkens (1991) 197 
151 McConnell, Ozbilgin, Wahal (2010) 1 
152 Miles, Rosenfeld (1983) define spin‐off as “the transaction through which a company distributes all of the 
common shares it owns in a controlled subsidiary to its existing shareholders, thereby creating a separate 
public company”. 
153 Miles and Rosenfeld (1983) 1 
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4.2. Overview on the applied event study methodology 
 
4.2.1. Definition of the events of interest 
The scope of the event study performed is to infer how the markets reacted to the decisions 
concerning the IPO of the Concessions subsidiary. For this purpose, the three events that 
conveyed information regarding 
 the intention to stock list the Hochtief subsidiary 
  the price range set for the IPO and 
  the call-off of the IPO before the intended first trading day 
have been selected for the event study analysis. The official announcement dates as per 
Hochtief, respecting the same order of events as above, were the 5th of November, the 19th 
of November and the 3rd of December 2009. 
 
 
Figure 8 Timeline of the IPO related announcements 
 
For each of these events a separate analysis is performed in order to derive the abnormal 
returns. 
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4.2.2. Definition of the event and estimation window 
Although the exact dates of the 3 announcements selected for the event study are known, it 
is not fully certain whether the new information reached the investors on the same day 
before the market close or perhaps the trading on the new information was delayed to the 
next day. In contrast, the possibility that investors had private information on the IPO 
intentions before the official announcements cannot be excluded.  
In an attempt to account for possible information leakages before the announcement as well 
as gradual adjustments of the stock prices in incorporating the new information, the event 
window used to infer the abnormal returns was extended to 3 days centered on the 
announcement date.  
Extending the event window beyond 3 days was not considered suitable due to the very 
short distance in time between the events (10 trading days) and also due to the increasing 
possibility of capturing other effects or diluting the cumulative abnormal returns. 
The data subset used to determine the parameters of the regression model – also referred 
to as the estimation window- contained 126 trading days154, corresponding to half of a 
trading year. According to Benninga, “the estimation window is supposedly a period free of 
any problems- that is, a period that reflects the stock’s price normal movements.” 155 It is 
thus a widely accepted practice to avoid the inclusion of the event window in the estimation 
window. The figure below illustrates the timeline of the event study; the event window of 
length  ܮଵ ൌ ଶܶ െ ଵܶ centered on the event of interest (of notation 0) lies in the continuation 
of the estimation window of length ܮ଴ ൌ ଵܶ െ ଴ܶ . The interval notation in the figure indicates 
that there is no overlapping between the defined windows. 
 
Figure 9 Timeline of the event study156 
                                                            
 
154 Campbell (1997) 151 
155 Benninga (2008) 372 
156 Campbell (1997) 159 
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4.2.3. Data collection and computation 
To correctly measure the announcement effects on equity, it is necessary to control for 
external factors.157 The selection of the benchmark in the event study therefore plays a key 
role in capturing overall market and industry effects. Striving for the better proxy of the 
market portfolio that would permit the better isolation of exogenous factors, I carried out the 
current event study with the DAX 30 Xetra performance index. The DAX 30 is commonly 
used as a proxy for the German market portfolio. 
The data on the prices was collected from Datastream and Yahoo Finance and features 
Hochtief’s daily adjusted closing prices registered on the Xetra trading platform and the daily 
closing values of the performance index DAX 30 Xetra.  
The daily returns were calculated as continuous returns, using the natural logarithm 
function: 
R୲ ൌ lnሺP୲ሻ െ logሺP୲ିଵሻ 
where R୲  designates the daily returns and P୲ the security price respectively the price index 
at time t. 
A quick test showed that for the data available, the discrete returns  R୲ ൌ P౪P౪షభ െ 1  differ only 
slightly from the continuous ones. 
  
                                                            
 
157 Serra (2002) 3 
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4.2.4. Measuring the abnormal returns 
The expected or normal returns are derived from the historical stock prices of the respective 
firm typically over a period prior to the event by applying one of the several regression 
models available. Depending on the assumptions made in respect to the behavior of the 
asset returns158, the regression models roughly fit into two categories: statistical models and 
economic models. Both feature statistical assumptions; however the latter category 
introduces additionally certain economic restrictions. Campbell explains that the  
“potential advantage of economic models is not the absence of statistical assumptions, 
but the opportunity to calculate more precise measures of the normal return using 
economic restrictions.”159 
The simplest statistical model that can be used for measuring the expected returns is the 
constant-mean-return model, which assumes that mean stock returns tend towards a 
constant value. Despite of its simplicity, Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) find that “it often 
yields results similar to other more sophisticated models.”160  
The most widely accepted statistical model is the market model, which relates the stock 
returns of a firm to the returns of the market portfolio. It introduces an improvement to the 
constant-mean-return model since it eliminates the portion of the abnormal return caused by 
market movements and thereby reduces the variance of the abnormal return. The CAPM 
based economic model has a similar structure to the market model, but imposes additional 
restrictions on the regression equation to be used, e.g. assigning fixed values to the 
intercept. The CAPM based model has to-date little practical relevance - as the underlying 
equilibrium theory was proven to not always hold in real markets, it has lost ground to 
models with more lax assumptions. The APT161 based economic model in contrast “does 
not impose false restrictions on the returns”. However its use “complicates the 
implementation of an event study with little practical advantage to the unrestricted market 
model.” 162 
                                                            
 
158 Campbell (1997) 153 
159 Campbell (1997) 155 
160 Campbell (1997) 154 
161 Acronym for the Arbitrage Pricing Theory  
162 Campbell (1997) 156 
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In light of its relative superiority from a robustness and complexity point of view, the market 
model has been chosen for the event study conducted in this paper. 
The equation implied by the market based model for the expected returns is 
ܴ௧ுை் ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚܴ௧௕௘௡௖௛௠௔௥௞ ൅ ߝ௧ 
“with ܧሾߝ௧ሿ ൌ 0 and ܸܽݎሾߝ௧ሿ ൌ ߪఌ೟ଶ  and ܴ௧ுை் ܽ݊݀ ܴ௧௕௘௡௖௛௠௔௥௞ the period-t returns of the 
security respectively the market portfolio and ߝ௧ the zero-mean disturbance term, ߙ, ߚ and 
ߪఌ೟ଶ  the regression parameters.”163 
The abnormal returns within the estimation window were computed as 
߳௧̂כ ൌ ܴ௧כ െ ߙො െ ߚመܴ௠כ  
Where ܴ௧כ  is the observed window return, ߙො and ߚመ are the regression output values. 164 
The table below shows the regression parameters obtained for each of the events of 
interest. For all 3 events, the standard error ranges from 1.8% to 2%, whereas ܴଶ from 
0.5069 to 0.5236. 
Event 
Estimation 
window 
(trading 
days) 
Event 
window 
(trading 
days) 
Regression parameters 
ࢻෝ ࢼ෡ Standard error ࡾ૛ 
1 (IPO intentions) 126 3 1.3228 0.0018 2.00% 0.5069 
2 (IPO details) 126 3 1.3045 0.0019 1.90% 0.5056 
3 (IPO call-off) 126 3 1.2671 0.0019 1.80% 0.5236 
Table 13 Event study: Output parameters of the regression equations 
 
The following table summarizes the daily abnormal returns within the event window 
calculated with the previously derived regression parameters: 
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Event Abnormal Return Day 1 
Abnormal Return 
Day 2 
Abnormal Return 
Day 3 
1 (IPO intentions) 2.12% 1.92% 2.48% 
2 (IPO details) -1.61% -0.49% -0.50% 
3 (IPO call-off) -1.02% 0.35% 0.45% 
Table 14 The daily abnormal returns for the 3 events of interest 
 
4.2.5. Time series aggregation 
The abnormal returns must be aggregated over the event window in order to draw overall 
inferences about the market reaction.165 The aggregation of the abnormal returns over the 
event window can be performed using the cumulative average residual method (CAR). CAR 
“tests the null hypothesis that the mean abnormal returns measured are equal to zero.”166 
The cumulative average residual method (CAR) uses as the abnormal performance 
measure the sum of each abnormal performance. The CAR starting at time ݐଵ through time 
ݐଶ is defined as: 
ܥܣܴሺݐଵ, ݐଶሻ ൌ ෍ ߳௧̂כ
௧మ
௧ୀ௧భ
 
where ଵܶ ൑ ݐଵ ൑ ݐଶ ൏ ଶܶ 
CARs thus reflect in a consolidated form the shareholder wealth changes around an event 
of interest.167 
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4.2.6. Test statistics  
Prior to interpreting the results of an event study it is necessary to verify whether the 
abnormal returns are significant. For this purpose, it is sufficient to perform a test statistic of 
the CAR and compare it to the assumed distribution under the null hypothesis. The null 
hypothesis is thus rejected if the test statistic exceeds a critical value, typically 
corresponding to the 5% or 1% in the tail region (i.e. the test level or size of the test is 0.05 
or 0.01). 168 
“For the CAR shown in the previous equation, a standard test statistic is the CAR divided by 
an estimate of its standard deviation. The test statistic is in consequence given by:  
ܵܥܣܴሺ෣ ݐଵ,ݐଶሻ ൌ ܥܣܴሺݐଵ,ݐଶሻ
෣
ߪොሺݐଵ,ݐଶሻ  
where ܵܥܣ෣ܴ  represents the standardized cumulative abnormal return ”169 
The alternative solution to estimating the standard deviation of the cumulative abnormal 
returns put forward by Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay is  
ߪොଶ൫ݐଵ,ݐଶ൯ ൌ 1ሺܮଵ െ 2ሻ ෍ ߳௧̂
כଶ
భ்ିଵ
௧ୀ బ்
 
with  ܮଵ, the length of the estimation window. 170 
Under the ܪ଴ hypothesis 
ܥܣܴሺݐଵ,ݐଶሻ෣  ~ ܰሺ0, ߪොଶሺݐଵ,ݐଶሻሻ 
And the distribution of ܵܥܣܴሺݐଵ,ݐଶሻ෣   is Student t with ܮଵ െ 2  degrees of freedom. From the 
properties of the Student t distribution, the expectation of ܵܥܣܴሺ෣ ݐଵ,ݐଶሻ is 0 and the variance 
is ௅ଵିଶ௅ଵିସ. For a large estimation window, e.g. if ܮଵ is greater than 30 days, the distribution of  
ܵܥܣܴሺݐଵ,ݐଶሻ෣   is well approximated by the standard normal. 171 
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The results of the test statistics are shown in the table below: 
Event 
Abnormal returns 
ࡿ࡯࡭ࡾ෣  Test Statistics - Rejection of ࡴ૙ ࡭ࡾ૚෣ ࡭ࡾ૛෣ ࡭ࡾ૜෣ 3day ࡯࡭ࡾ෣  
Event 1 
(IPO 
intentions) 
2.12% 1.92% 2.48% 6.52% 3.2742 Yes, at a confidence level of 99% 
Event 2 
(IPO details) -1.61% -0.49% -0.50% -2.60% -1.3678 
Yes, at a  confidence level of 
90% 
Event 3 
(IPO call-
off) 
-1.02% 1.36% 0.45% 0.80% 0.4448 No, insignificant 
Table 15 Cumulative abnormal returns and test statistics results for the events of interest 
 
To summarize 
 the announcement of the IPO intentions generated cumulative abnormal returns of  
6.52% within the 3 day event window; the test statistics supports the rejection of the 
null hypothesis; the abnormal returns are significant at a 99% confidence level 
 the announcement of the IPO details led to cumulative abnormal returns of -2.60% 
within the 3 day event window; the test statistics supports the rejection of the H଴ 
hypothesis at a 90% confidence level 
 the announcement of the IPO call-off generated cumulative abnormal returns of  
0.80% within the 3 day event window; the abnormal returns are insignificant and  the 
H଴ hypothesis cannot be rejected 
 
4.2.7. Model robustness check 
With the intention of checking the robustness of the obtained results in respect to the 
regression model chosen, I reiterated the event study by substituting the market model with 
two further regression models: the constant-mean-return and the CAPM based models 
described in subsection 4.1. 
 
The results are shown in the following table: 
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Event 
Abnormal returns 
ࡿ࡯࡭ࡾ෣  Test Statistics - Rejection of ࡴ૙ 
࡭ࡾ૚෣ ࡭ࡾ૛෣ ࡭ࡾ૜෣ 3day ࡯࡭ࡾ෣  
Event 1 
(IPO 
intentions) 
4.29% 2.70% 2.55% 9.54% 3.371 Yes, at a confidence level of 99% 
Event 2 
(IPO details) -1.41% -2.38% -1.40% -5.19% -1.923 Yes, at a confidence level of 95% 
Event 3 
(IPO call-
off) 
-1.51% 2.20% -0.46% 0.24% 0.091 No, insignificant 
Table 16 Cumulative abnormal returns and test statistics computed with the CAPM based model 
 
Event 
Abnormal returns 
ࡿ࡯࡭ࡾ෣  Test Statistics - Rejection of ࡴ૙ ࡭ࡾ૚෣ ࡭ࡾ૛෣ ࡭ࡾ૜෣ 3day ࡯࡭ࡾ෣  
Event 1 
(IPO 
intentions) 
4.25% 2.71% 2.55% 9.51% 3.361 yes, at a confidence level of 99% 
Event 2 
(IPO 
details) 
-1.60% -2.62% -1.58% -5.80% -2.144 yes, at a confidence level of 95% 
Event 3 
(IPO call-
off) 
-1.40% 2.27% -0.4% 0.47% 0.181 no, insignificant 
Table 17 Cumulative abnormal returns and test statistics computed with the constant-mean-return model 
Both regression models yield fairly similar results; furthermore, the abnormal returns 
estimated for each of the first two events are higher (in module) than those generated by the 
market model. For the third event, both the constant-mean-model and the CAPM based 
model lead to lower abnormal returns than the market model. 
Nonetheless, all 3 models yield consistent results in terms of the significance of the 
abnormal returns for events studied: 
 the first event’s abnormal returns are significant at a confidence level of 99% 
 the second event’s abnormal returns are significant at a confidence level of at least 
90% 
 the third event is insignificant. The null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
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4.3. Findings  
 
4.3.1. Event 1 - The announcement of the IPO intentions  
I found that the announcement of Hochtief’s intentions to undergo an IPO of the 
concessions subsidiary was very well received by the markets. The 6.52% positive 
cumulative abnormal returns proved significant at a confidence level of 99%. I measured the 
highest daily abnormal returns at 2.48% on the day after the official announcement. 
The findings seem to be consistent with the spin-off hypothesis of Miles and Rosenfeld 
(1983), which predicts that spin-off announcements have a positive influence on stock 
prices. Miles and Rosenfeld claim by quoting Hakansson that in case of incomplete financial 
markets, a spin-off might expand the opportunity set available to investors. Even if there are 
no synergies to be clearly attained through the transaction, spin-offs might provide investors 
in imperfect markets with more flexibility in their choice of dividends versus capital gains. 172 
The results also would support a line of argument of shareholder value added due to the 
increased liquidity of the stock. The Pecking Order theory of financing has little explanatory 
power in this case; following its logic equity issues are typically bad news, so one would 
expect a negative price reaction to the announcements of equity issues unless the markets 
are peaking;173 this is however not the case: although the IPO market showed signs of 
recovery towards the end of 2009, the lingering effects of the global financial crisis and the 
deterioration of investor sentiment in the wake of the Dubai crisis were still leaving their 
mark. 
 
4.3.2. Event 2 - The announcement of the IPO details  
Two weeks after the announcement of the desired floatation for Hochtief Concessions, the 
details of the IPO were made public; on this occasion, information such as the price range 
for the book-building, desired future capital structure and total issue volume were 
communicated to investors.  
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The results of the event study suggest that the investors perceived the new information as 
bad news; stock prices steadily dropped over the 3 day event window with abnormal returns 
totaling to -2.60%.  
A possible explanation could lie in the prevalence of information asymmetry, in other words 
investor uncertainty about the company’s worth. If markets are less informed than the 
company’s management about the value of the assets in place, they draw overall inferences 
from the new information that the company disseminates. The new pricing details 
communicated by Hochtief might have signaled a slight overpricing to the markets, which 
triggered a corresponding adjustment in the share price.  
 
4.3.3. Event 3 – The announcement of the IPO call-off 
Out of the 3 events in scope of the current analysis, the announcement of the IPO call-off is 
the most puzzling. In contrast to the other 2 events, the reactions around the IPO 
cancellation notice are mixed and no clear trend becomes apparent over the 3 event 
window. The abnormal returns computed amount to -1.02% on the day before the 
announcement, then jump to 1.36% on the announcement date and settle to 0.45% on the 
following day. The estimated cumulative abnormal return of 0.8% does not support the 
rejection of the null hypothesis.  
One possible interpretation of this outcome is that the call-off was already anticipated by the 
investors and the information was already impounded in the stock price at the time of the 
event. Inferring that the announcement was perceived by investors to not affect their wealth 
can easily be discarded if taking into account the positive significant reaction to the 
announcement of the IPO intentions, which conveyed the exact opposite signal. 
 
As a final word, the interpretation of the event study results is to be closely interlinked with 
the valuation outcome of the thesis – when an estimate of the fair value of the concessions 
subsidiary is available, we can better understand and analyze the market reactions. Chapter 
5 explores this topic thoroughly. 
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4.4. Possible biases  
 
4.4.1. Uncertainty regarding the event date 
The event study used the issue dates of Hochtief’s press releases published on the 
company website as reference dates for the announcements. These were crosschecked 
against the announcement dates indicated in the press, using as sources several 
newspapers articles from the popular press, e.g. Financial Times Deutschland and The Wall 
Street Journal.  
Furthermore, as previously mentioned, it is possible that the announcement occurred after 
the close of the market and thus the trading on the new information was possible only on the 
next day. 
I addressed this issue of uncertainty by expanding the event window to one additional day; 
however this action comes at a cost - that of distorting the abnormal returns on the actual 
announcement date. By making reference to existing studies on this matter, Campbell 
contends that the losses of explanatory power due to the increased length of the event 
window are clearly set off by the risk of missing the event.174 
 
4.4.2. Pre-announcement trading  
A factor that could have potentially distorted the observable abnormal returns within the 
event window is the availability of private information to certain investors before the official 
announcement date. Depending on its order of magnitude (number of better informed 
investors, days lead time), the trading on new information prior to its being made public can 
considerably bias the results of the event study anchored on the official announcement date 
or even lead to insignificant abnormal returns.  
In their paper “Why does the reaction to news announcements vary across countries?” 
Griffin, Hershey and Kelly (2008) examine the differences in stock reactions to corporate 
announcements across different countries. Using as a proxy for announcement reaction the 
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abnormal returns scaled by the average non-event daily volatility, Griffin, Hershey and Kelly 
show that the German market is characterized by a moderate reaction to announcements.  
They attempt to trace the cross-country variations in stock market response back to five 
possible factors: poor accounting quality, inattentive investors, poor news dissemination, 
public pre-announcement trading and insider trading.175 They find evidence of 
preannouncement trading due to early news dissemination either through public or private 
information sources. 
A  study of Bhattacharya et al. on international insider trading regulations underpins the fact 
that even though developed countries among which Germany have introduced insider 
trading laws, the enforcement of these laws have been timid.176 Dymke and Walter (2008) 
focus in a recent paper on German corporate insiders trading on private information and 
show that members of supervisory boards have the tendency “to be most active in exploiting 
inside information, since they realize exceptionally high profits with their frequent front-
running transactions.” 177 
In conclusion, although Germany is characterized by mature capital markets subject to strict 
regulations, the empirical evidence on market prices behavior around corporate 
announcements does not allow us to rule out the possibility of insider trading. Furthermore, 
browsing through the articles dedicated to Hochtief’s IPO, it became evident that rumors 
about the IPO intentions were spreading already before the official announcement in 
November 2009, which would imply that public trading on the respective information might 
have started much earlier. 
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4.4.3. Nonsynchronous trading 
Non-synchronous trading can constitute a further potential source of bias to the event study. 
Campbell defines non-synchronous trading as the effect arising when “prices are taken to be 
recorded at time intervals of one length, when in fact they are recorded at time intervals of 
other possibly irregular lengths.”178  
When drawing upon closing prices in an event study, one implicitly assumes that these 
prices arose at the exact same time each day, i.e. the closing time; but closing prices are in 
fact the prices at which the latest transaction is performed on the respective trading day, 
meaning that especially for securities not so intensively traded, the deviations from the 
closing time can be substantial.  
The non-synchronous trading effect consequently produces a bias in the estimation of the 
market model parameters by altering the variances and covariances of the individual stocks 
and portfolios; however the higher the trading volumes, the lower the impact and dimensions 
of the bias. 
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5. Interpretation of the results  
 
In view of the results yielded by the valuation and the event study analysis, the current 
chapter attempts to offer possible explanations for the IPO failure of Hochtief Concessions 
by answer the three key questions introduced at the beginning of the thesis. 
 
5.1. Did the cold IPO market and overall investor sentiment lead to the 
failure of the IPO transaction? 
 
Hochtief decision to cancel the IPO of its subsidiary in the last minute was clearly based on 
the very low demand for its stock. Citing a Financial Times article, right before the call-off 
only 60% of the book was filled, mainly due to a low demand from non-domestic 
investors.179  
Whereas Hochtief argued that the low demand was a direct consequence of the Dubai crisis 
deteriorating the market conditions and shattering investor optimism, there is insubstantial 
evidence to support its statement. Indeed, the timing of its IPO was not advantageous: by 
the end of 2009, the economies of the industrialized countries had only timidly started to 
show signs of recovery after the financial crisis of the previous years. If drawing upon the 
hot-cold IPO markets hypothesis, we could label this as a bad time to issue equity given the 
less favorable macroeconomic environment and high investor uncertainty. However, the fact 
that an increasing number of economic entities announced intentions to launch initial public 
offerings around the same time as Hochtief suggests that the IPO markets were already 
picking up. I mention a few suggestive examples: 
 The IPO of the Chinese engineering company Vtion was carried out in Frankfurt in 
Oct 2009, shortly before Hochtief Concessions’ planned floatation on the 4th of 
December 2009. 
 The Danish renewable energy company ScanEnergy also planned to quote in 
Frankfurt in December 2009. 
 The biotech company Movetis completed its IPO on Euronext in December 2009. 
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 The UK fund manager Gartmore organized its first floatation in London in December 
2009. 
 Fashion retailer Yoox went live on the Milan stock exchange at the end of November 
2009.  
 The luxury goods retailer CFAO went public in December with books more than twice 
covered. 180 
 Hochtief’s competitor Bilfinger Berger had also announced in December 2009 its 
intentions to carry out an IPO for one of its subsidiaries in the first quarter of 2010.181  
Without doubt, the fear of a possible default of Dubai World on its debt shortly stirred up the 
markets to the time of Hochief Concessions’ planned IPO and numerous articles in the 
popular press underpin this argument. Quite surprisingly, however, in the time period of 
November-December 2009, the German DAX attained a year-record performance, 
suggesting that the German markets reacted little to the Dubai debacle (see figure below). 
Also, the Eurostoxx composite index for Construction and Materials companies, which 
includes Hochtief and some of its key competitors, was on an increasing trend during 2009, 
which it picked up for the last two months of the year after the drop on the 30th of October.  
 
Figure 10 DAX performance 2009 182 
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Figure 11 EuroStoxx Construction and Materials performance 2009183 
Most journalists covering the story of the failed IPO also expressed skepticism towards the 
credibility of the unfavorable market conditions compromising its success. They introduce an 
additional convincing argument: in the week Hochtief Concessions planned its IPO, the 
Bank of America was able to raise USD 19.3 bn in equity, despite the Dubai turmoil.184 
The event study analysis showed that the markets hardly reacted to Hochtief’s IPO 
cancellation notice, rendering no significant abnormal returns. This implies that this outcome 
might have been already anticipated by the markets and the information was already 
impounded in the stock price at the time of the event. In other words, investors seemed to 
have had a clear picture early in the process about how the IPO would turn out, suggesting 
that perhaps there was a knock-out criterion which the deal failed to meet in the first place. 
Since the timing does not seem to be as inopportune as Hochtief insinuated, we further 
analyze the possibility of a mispricing. 
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5.2. Did Hochtief sufficiently underprice its new equity issue to spark 
investor interest?  
 
The Discounted Cash Flow valuation performed in chapter 3 rendered a share price of EUR 
28.50 for Hochtief Concessions. The relative valuation yielded a slightly lower value of EUR 
27.69 per share. Both prices are close to the upper bound of the interval set by Hochtief of 
EUR 24 to EUR 29, suggesting a fair offering price. In addition, the maximum underpricing 
that Hochtief was willing to accept was approx. 15% of its estimated fair value. 
Reviewing the empirical findings on the underpricing presented in chapter 2, we find that the 
level of underpricing chosen by Hochtief is generally in line with historical average values. 
For Germany, Ljungqvist (1997) reports on a sample of 180 IPOs between 1970 and 1993 
an average initial return of 9.2%.185 When analyzing the German New Market during the hot 
issue period 1997 to 2000, Goergen and Khurshed observe an underpricing of about 53%, 
approx 5 times higher than the one reported by Ljungqvist.186 However, as we have seen in 
chapter 2, hot IPO markets are characterized by excessive underpricing, therefore not 
suitable to draw overall inferences. Finally, the mean (median) underpricing that the CFOs 
participating in the 2003 survey of Brau and Fawcett expect in an IPO is 14.9% (10%). 
The underpricing assumed to be required on average by the German markets explains why 
the price of Hochtief Concessions’ stock converged in the grey market to the lower end of 
the offer price range during the bookbuilding process. Still, the demand for the stock was 
considerably below expectations, making way for speculations that Hochtief should have 
underpriced more aggressively to attract investors.  
“The banks made a wrong move when they announced expectations that the price per 
share would range from EUR 24 to EUR 29, Christian Kirchner, Financial Times 
Deutschland editor-in-chief, wrote. Such pricing corresponded to a deduction of 
between 6% and 22% against the intrinsic value of Hochtief's subsidiary. This is a way 
short of the between 25% and 45% discounts at which other infrastructure 
construction companies are currently trading, Kirchner wrote further.” 187 
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Arguably, the market’s negative reaction to the price range announcement might support the 
hypothesis that at this point in time investors already discounted back the initially estimated 
added value that the IPO would have generated, since they anticipated that the IPO would 
not go through with such an ambitious offer price. 
But what are the factors that explain the higher underpricing required by the markets? One 
possible answer lies in the information asymmetries between the company and the outside 
investors regarding the quality of the assets in place aggravated by the complex business 
model of Hochtief Concessions and its intransparent portfolio of minority shareholdings in 
more than 30 project companies. Investors seem to have expected to be compensated for 
the risk of investing in a company with such a complex and difficult to grasp business model, 
consisting mainly of projects in early low-cash-flow stages. As proof to the prevalence of 
information asymmetry in respect of the concessions business value, the Bankhaus Lampe 
analysts make reference to Hochtief’s past actions of selling some fractions of their stakes in 
order to signal the value of their holdings to the markets.188 
 
5.3. Were the signals that the company conveyed to the markets convincing 
enough in respect to the value of the firm? 
 
In their survey among CFOs, Brau and Fawcett (2006) test several signaling mechanisms 
proposed by the IPO literature and find that the most important positive signal to CFOs are a 
“strong history of earnings” and “underwriter certification”, whereas the negative signals are 
“selling a large portion of the firm in the IPO, as well as selling insider shares in an IPO”.189 
When applying the same framework of signaling mechanisms to Hochtief Concessions’ IPO, 
we find that both positive and negative signals got across to the markets: 
 Volatile historical earnings. Hochtief provided a short history of earnings of its 
young concessions subsidiary in its first press release about the IPO and in the 
stock exchange prospectus. A striking feature about the reported earnings was the 
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very high volatility, which made it difficult to observe a trend in its performance over 
the reported 4 years.  
 Well-reputed underwriters. In their press release, Hochtief announced that the IPO 
process was accompanied by Citi, Deutsche Bank and Goldman Sachs as Global 
Coordinators, Barclays Capital, Citi, Deutsche Bank and Goldman Sachs as Joint 
Bookrunners and Abn Amro, Calyon, Commerzbank and HSBC Trinkaus as Co-
Lead Managers.190 In choosing its underwriters and coordinators for the deal, 
Hochtief seems thus to have made no compromises, as all partners from the deal 
are among the best reputed and successful in their industry. 
 Desire to maintain a controlling stake. Although the fraction of existing equity that 
was on sale was evaluated at between 60% and 65% of the initial equity value, 
Hochtief clearly stated that it intended to hold a majority stake of 51% in its 
subsidiary in the IPO aftermath191.  
Furthermore, if we consider underpricing itself as a signal of firm quality and assume that 
there would have been a second equity sale stage planed, in consistence with Grinblatt and 
Ibbotson’s theories, then we can conclude that Hochtief wouldn’t have conveyed a 
convincing message to the markets through its low underpricing: had the deal gone through, 
the returns on the first day of trading would have reached a maximum of 15%. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
The present thesis explored how information asymmetries affect the timing and the pricing 
of an Initial Public Offering by examining the failed attempt of the construction company 
Hochtief to list its Concessions subsidiary on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange in November 
2009.  
Upon inferring about the fair equity value of Hochtief Concessions and deriving the market 
reactions to the IPO, I attempted to answer three key questions: 
 Did the cold IPO market and overall investor sentiment lead to the failure of the IPO 
transaction? 
 Did Hochtief sufficiently underprice its new equity issue to spark investor interest?  
 Were the signals that the company conveyed to the markets convincing enough in 
respect to the value of the firm? 
Below I summarize the main findings.  
The Discounted Cash Flow valuation of chapter three revealed a share price for Hochtief 
Concessions of EUR 28.5. I crosschecked this result by looking at how a selection of 
comparable companies is priced by the markets in respect to its earnings. I found that the 
equity value derived with the DCF method is in line with the prevailing value judgments of 
the markets in the year of the planned IPO. 
Chapter four gave an overview of the event study conceived to capture the market reactions 
to the announcements concerning the IPO; I found that the markets perceived the IPO as a 
value increasing transaction, as the abnormal returns triggered by the official announcement 
amounted to 6.52%. Further, as the IPO details including the offer price range were made 
public, a negative price adjustment occurred, with abnormal returns reaching -2.60%. 
Finally, the IPO call-off notice seemed to hardly come as a surprise to investors, since the 
abnormal returns rendered by the event study are insignificant. 
Chapter five brought all the pieces of the puzzle together in order to answer the 
aforementioned key questions. I postulated that, although market conditions deteriorated in 
the wake of the Dubai crisis, the German markets and the construction industry remained 
largely unaffected, maintaining their ascending trend visible throughout 2009; secondly, the 
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success of further IPOs carried out in the same time corridor as Hochtief counters the 
company’s allegations that the poor market conditions led to a low demand for new equities.  
Hochtief’s too ambitious price expectations seem to better explain why the books were only 
to 60% full at the end of the bookbuilding process. Whereas the IPO literature predicts an 
average underpricing of 10%-15%, the price range set by Hochief corresponded to a 
discount of 0% to a maximum of 15% from the fair price. Investors, however, seemed to 
have required an additional premium which Hochtief failed to provide; by underpricing the 
offer more aggressively, the company could have compensated investors for the higher risk 
they would have exposed themselves to by investing in a company with such a complex and 
intransparent business model.  
Finally, I found that the signals conveyed by the announcements were mixed: whereas 
Hochtief’s underwriter selection and desire to detain a controlling stake in the emerging 
public company must have been received well by the markets, the volatile historical 
earnings might have reduced investor confidence in the financial robustness of the 
Concessions subsidiary. 
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 Appendix 
 
Abstract (Engl.) 
Systematic underpricing and cyclicity192 are perhaps the most intriguing empirical 
regularities about Initial Public Offerings (IPOs). A vast body of literature has been dedicated 
to explaining these phenomena that, at a first glance, seem to contradict market efficiency 
principles and even the rationality of economic actors.  
The present thesis is intended as an empirical study on how information asymmetries affect 
the timing and the pricing of an IPO.  
Setting out from the last-moment decision of the German infrastructure company Hochtief to 
pull the IPO of its Concessions subsidiary in November 2009, the current thesis explores the 
underlying facts and attempts to provide possible explanations for the IPO failure by drawing 
upon existing theories. Concretely, the thesis builds on the following key questions:  
 Did the cold IPO market and overall investor sentiment lead to the failure of the IPO? 
 Did Hochtief sufficiently underprice its new equity issue to spark investor interest? 
 Were the signals that the company conveyed to the markets convincing enough in 
respect to the value of the firm? 
The paper is structured in 6 main chapters. The introduction outlines the background and 
the research objectives of the paper. The second chapter shortly reviews some key 
empirical findings and theories on IPO pricing and timing to the market. The third chapter 
features a valuation of Hochtief Concessions’ equity meant to provide an estimate of the fair 
value of the company and to make inferences about the extent of underpricing possible. The 
event study analysis in chapter four is designed to capture the market reactions to the IPO 
announcements. Chapter five aims at providing answers to the afore-mentioned questions 
based on the results of the valuation and the event study analysis. Chapter six concludes. 
 
 
                                                            
 
 
 Abstract (Deutsch) 
Das Ansetzen des Emissionskurses unter dem fairen Unternehmenswert und die 
Marktzyklizität sind wohl die faszinierendsten empirischen Befunde rund um 
Börseneinführungen. Wissenschaftler haben diesen zwei Phänomenen, die auf den ersten 
Blick Markteffizienzprinzipien und der Rationalität der Investoren widersprechen besondere 
Achtung geschenkt: denn erstens unterstellen die Grundtheorien der Finanzwirtschaft, dass 
Börsengange kapitalwertneutrale Transaktionen sind, ergo ihr Timing zum Markt sollte 
überhaupt keinen Einfluss auf das Emissionsvolumen oder auf den Preis haben. Zweitens 
ist es zu erwarten, dass rationale Anteilseigner nicht freiwillig ihre Vermögensteile im Zuge 
eines Börsenganges unter ihrem wahren Wert verkaufen wollen. 
Im Kontext der gescheiterten Neuemission von Hochtief Concessions an der Frankfurter 
Börse in November 2009, untersucht die vorliegende Arbeit wie sich 
Informationsasymmetrien auf die Preissetzung und auf das Timing eines Börsenganges 
auswirken können. Es wird versucht die möglichen Ursachen der gescheiterten Transaktion 
aufzudecken und Antworten zu den folgenden Fragen zu formulieren: 
 War das Scheitern des Börsenganges auf der negativen Grundstimmung der 
Investoren zurückzuführen? 
 War die implizierte Emissionsrendite groß genug, um das Interesse der Investoren 
für den Börsengang zu wecken? 
 Konnten die von Hochtief übermittelten Signale wie z.B. die historische 
Finanzleistung die Investoren von einem hohen Unternehmenswert überzeugen?  
Die Arbeit ist in 6 Kapitel gegliedert. Im ersten Kapitel werden die Fragestellung sowie die 
Forschungsziele der Arbeit vorgestellt. Im zweiten Kapitel werden die wesentlichen 
empirischen Erkenntnisse und Theorien zur Preissetzung und Timing von 
Börsennotierungen erörtert. Das dritte Kapitel beinhaltet eine Bewertung des Eigenkapitals 
von Hochtief Concessions, die weitere Rückschlüsse über den fairen Wert des 
Unternehmens ermöglicht. Die Ereignisstudie in Kapitel vier erfasst die Reaktionen der 
Märkte auf Hochtiefs Ankündigungen über den Börsengang. Angesichts der Ergebnisse der 
Eigenkapitalbewertung und der Ereignisstudie, wird im fünften Kapitel versucht, die oben 
erwähnten Fragen zu beantworten. Das sechste Kapitel dient als Zusammenfassung der 
Arbeit. 
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